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Article
Judicial Analysis of Complex & Cutting-Edge Science
in the Daubert Era: Epidemiologic Risk Assessment as
a Test Case for Reform Strategies
ANDREW JURS
Since Daubert, courts have faced difficulty with screening cutting-edge
scientific evidence pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 702. By
inconsistently handling particularly complex epidemiologic studies in
Daubert reviews, judges analyzing this science exposed weaknesses of the
Daubert system. Weaknesses of the Daubert regime include judicial skills
with scientific methods, use of improper bright-line tests, outlier
enhancement of experts, and the incompatibility of some judicial procedure
with science. Each identified issue presents a reason why a judge may
inaccurately evaluate scientific principles.
To address these identified weaknesses, this Article proposes
modifications to the current system. One way to bring more science back
into the courthouse, or to the judge’s chambers, is to permit the
appointment of a science consultant under a modified Federal Rule of
Evidence 706. For an even smaller subset of more complex cases,
advanced science procedures will be needed. A science panel approach,
using a modified arbitration panel format, or a centralized court of
scientific jurisdiction would have advantages over the current system.
By critically examining the breakdown of Daubert in the face of
epidemiologic risk evidence, evaluating the nature of the weaknesses in the
system, and creating reforms structured to respond to those concerns, we
can modify the current Daubert system to allow judges to more
consistently, accurately and efficiently handle the most complex, cuttingedge science presented in litigation.
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Judicial Analysis of Complex & Cutting-Edge Science
in the Daubert Era: Epidemiologic Risk Assessment as
a Test Case for Reform Strategies
ANDREW JURS*
I. INTRODUCTION
In our American legal system, lawyers address controversies by
reducing them to their essential elements, presenting them in a courtroom,
and resolving them through the application of standard legal principles.
Certainly this ideal works well enough for wide varieties of cases—
criminal charges, a typical car crash, or contract disputes—subject to
decision making within the general parameters of the courtroom with the
application of general principles of law. Highly complex cases with
disputed questions of scientific fact, however, cast doubt on the general
principle.
Many commentators see science and the law as inherently
incompatible, particularly with the most cutting-edge or complex science.
Some highlight the distinction between the two methods of decision
making: science finds truth through experiments and testing while law
relies on rhetorical argument.1 Another commentator states that the
fundamental distinction is the handling of uncertainty: science recognizes
uncertainty and acknowledges it, law results in clear decisions out of
uncertain principles.2 A third commentator states that the problem lies in
the way judges review particularly complex science (e.g., toxicity
evidence): scientists rely on all data available while judges rely on single
sources to their detriment.3
*

Assistant Professor of Law, Florida Coastal School of Law, 2009–present; Visiting Assistant
Professor of Law, Wake Forest University, 2008–2009. J.D., University of California, Berkeley,
School of Law (Boalt Hall); B.A., Stanford University. The author wishes to thank Michael D. Green,
Sidney Shapiro, Ronald Wright, Dick Schneider, Kami Simmons, Scott Shepard, and Joseph Sanders
for their comments on earlier versions of this work. Thanks also to Katie, Clara, and Milo, without
whom this paper would not have been possible.
1
Jan Beyea & Daniel Berger, Scientific Misconceptions Among Daubert Gatekeepers: The Need
for Reform of Expert Review Procedures, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring/Summer 2001, at 327,
333.
2
Sander Greenland, The Need for Critical Appraisal of Expert Witnesses in Epidemiology and
Statistics, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 291, 293–94 (2004) [hereinafter Greenland, Critical Appraisal].
Some courts explicitly recognize this inherent limitation in the judicial versus scientific methods as
well. See, e.g., United States v. Mass. Water Res. Auth., 97 F. Supp. 2d 155, 157 (D. Mass. 2000).
3
David E. Bernstein, Expert Witnesses, Adversarial Bias, and the (Partial) Failure of the Daubert
Revolution, 93 IOWA L. REV. 451, 475–76 (2008).
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If science and the law are fundamentally incompatible, as these
scientists suggest, then what framework is appropriate for judicial review
of difficult scientific principles?
Pursuant to the Daubert decision and Federal Rule of Evidence 702,4
judges screen scientific expert testimony prior to presentation at trial.5 The
screening process exists to ensure evidentiary reliability and relevance so
that only appropriate science is admitted at trial. In Daubert, the United
States Supreme Court plainly stated, and therefore assumed, that judges
would be able to make detailed determinations on all complex and cuttingedge scientific principles.6 The Court had no data or studies to prove this
assumption true, yet made it with the confidence that the proposition was
unquestionable.
Since Daubert in 1993, contradictory case law in the area of
epidemiologic risk assessment—a specialized area including highly
complex and cutting-edge science—has cast doubt on the Daubert
assumption of unquestioned judicial skill in expert testimony review. Case
law in the area has been highly contradictory, and savagely critiqued by
scientific reviewers.7 Some courts have directly reversed course, requiring
certain evidentiary underpinnings initially and then changing course in
more recent cases.8 Meanwhile, fundamental assumptions contained
within the scientific data have been unrecognized or ignored. All of these
factors from the epidemiologic risk controversy enhance uncertainty for
litigants in future cases.
By examining and analyzing the cases, commentary, and theories
surrounding the epidemiologic risk controversy, this Article first examines
the weaknesses of the judicial handling of difficult scientific evidence
under Daubert. By enumerating these weaknesses, one can begin to
suggest reforms to address the problems in judicial evaluation of complex
science. Systematic reforms allow judges the necessary tools to make
appropriate Daubert determinations on the most cutting-edge or complex
scientific controversies, such as the evidence from cases involving
epidemiologic risk assessment. With these new procedural reforms in
4

Federal Rule of Evidence 702 states:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in
the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient
facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and
(3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the
case.
FED. R. EVID. 702.
5
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993).
6
Id. at 592–93.
7
See infra Parts II.B.–D.
8
See id.
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place, courts can avoid the common problems with the evaluation of
complex science under Daubert, and overcome the supposed
incompatibility of the scientific and legal methodologies.
By reviewing the epidemiologic risk assessment case law and
commentary, evaluating the weaknesses of judicial evaluation of complex
science in the courtroom, and suggesting reform, this Article contends that
judicial officers can more accurately, efficiently, and consistently handle
controversies involving difficult scientific evidence.
II. EPIDEMIOLOGIC RISK ASSESSMENT IN TOXIC
TORT/PHARMACEUTICAL CASES
Epidemiology is a highly complex area of scientific inquiry, discussed
in a large number of detailed toxic tort case decisions. Judges evaluating
epidemiologic evidence for admissibility must use the Daubert test from
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 for determining relevance and reliability.
To determine the difficulties with the judicial handling of
epidemiologic risk, this section first briefly examines the general principles
of the Daubert system and then examines how those principles have been
applied in the epidemiologic risk case law. After reviewing the
inconsistent case law on this topic, this section analyzes additional grounds
that explain why epidemiologic risk case law provides a good example of
difficult science in the courts.
A. Daubert Background
Judicial recognition of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 as the mechanism
for admission of expert testimony occurred in Daubert, almost twenty
years after the initial adoption of Rule 702.9 In doing so, the ancien regimé
of Frye10 had been overthrown, replaced by judicial gatekeeping with a
new two-pronged approach for judicial evaluation of science.
Frye required that proponents of scientific techniques prove that the
techniques had gained general acceptance within the appropriate scientific
community prior to admission in court.11 During the last decade of the
Frye regime, courts adopted a patchwork of rules whereby the Frye
analysis would be applied for some testimony, while a Rule 702 approach
would be applied to other cases, with the distinction being between those
cases based on well-established theories and those employing new or novel
science.12
9

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585, 589, 597.
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
11
Id. at 1014.
12
See, e.g., United States v. Bynum, 3 F.3d 769, 773 (4th Cir. 1993) (discussing the argument
presented at the trial court level as to whether the science was “new” and therefore a mandated
10
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In contrast to the pre-1993 confusion with Frye and Rule 702
coexisting for different types of evidence, the universal Daubert standard
promised an era of simplicity and efficient analysis of scientific expert
testimony. To replace the general acceptance standard under Frye, the
Daubert Court stated that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 required a twopronged approach: judges would evaluate the reliability of the proposed
testimony and then determine if it was relevant to the case.13 Reliability is
the measure of the scientific worthiness of the evidence, measured by
multiple factors, including methodology, publication and peer review,
known rate of error, and standards and controls, as well as the general
acceptance.14 Relevance measures the “fit” of the testimony to the
controversy of the case.15
To make admissibility determinations on scientific evidence under
Rule 702, judges should apply the Daubert/702 standard to the proffered
testimony and decide if admissibility has been established. Dismissive of
the difficulty of applying the test to some scientific principles, the Daubert
Court stated plainly: “We are confident that federal judges possess the
capacity to undertake this review.”16
In the case of highly complex or cutting-edge science, judges
recognized immediately the burden placed upon them to make difficult
decisions.17 In the case of epidemiologic risk case law, judicial opinions
both recognize this difficulty and display the problem with the approach.
B. Epidemiology After Daubert: Daubert II and the Doubling-of-the-Risk
Approach
On remand in Daubert II, the Ninth Circuit faced review of the
epidemiologic evidence under the new standards for judicial review of
scientific evidence.18 The panel commented on its review capability,
stating that “judges ruling on the admissibility of expert scientific
testimony face a far more complex and daunting task in a post-Daubert
world than before.”19 Acknowledging that the judges may not be qualified
application of Frye); Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1132–34 (5th Cir. 1991)
(debating whether only Frye applies only to novel techniques, or whether there should be a Rule 702
reliability analysis as well, and noting split in circuits on Frye applicability); United States v. Hadley,
918 F.2d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 1990) (rejecting party’s claims that Frye’s novel evidence theory should
have applied rather than standard Rule 702 analysis); United States v. Metzger, 778 F.2d 1195, 1203–
04 (6th Cir. 1985) (applying general acceptance test of Frye, but noting a circuit split on the issue).
13
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592–93.
14
Id. at 593–94.
15
Id. at 591 (internal quotation marks omitted).
16
Id. at 593.
17
See discussion infra Part II.B. and text accompanying notes 19–21.
18
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. (Daubert II), 43 F.3d 1311, 1315 (9th Cir. 1995).
19
Id.
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to do so, the panel described the process as “uncomfortable” and
“daunting.”20 All of this difficulty resulted in the panel deciding to “take a
deep breath and proceed with this heady task.”21
The Daubert case on remand was heady indeed, although perhaps not
in the same way the Ninth Circuit intended. While the judicial evaluation
of complex science would be difficult, uncomfortable, or daunting in many
cases involving science, the Daubert II panel faced a highly complex toxic
tort case involving detailed epidemiologic studies with a battle of experts.22
In evaluating the epidemiologic evidence in the case, the court
recognized that the relative risk ratio would be a critical issue in evaluation
of the “fit” of the science to the controversy over Bendectin exposure.23
Relative risk is the ratio of the incidence rate of disease in the exposed
group as compared to an unexposed control group.24 In the Daubert case
the plaintiffs’ experts stated that Bendectin exposure in utero resulted in a
statistically significant relative risk of birth defects that was less than
two.25 Plaintiffs presented this evidence to prove the causation element of
their tort claim.
In deciding whether the plaintiffs had met their burden, the court first
determined that a relative risk “exceed[ing] 2” equals the “more likely than
not” standard of preponderance of the evidence, since above two the
chance of illness from the exposure exceeds the background chance of
disease from all other causes.26 The court also stated that any relative risk
of less than two tended to disprove causation.27 Because the plaintiffs’
experts concluded that the relative risk from Bendectin exposure was less
than two, the court concluded the plaintiffs could only show that the
exposure “could possibly have caused” the injuries.28 As a result, the court
granted summary judgment to the defense.29
Daubert II provided a high-profile and detailed precedent for other
courts to follow in their own analyses of epidemiologic evidence. Many
20

Id. at 1315–16.
Id. at 1316.
22
Id. at 1313–14, 1319.
23
Id. at 1320–21 (internal quotation marks omitted).
24
Michael D. Green et al., Reference Guide on Epidemiology, in FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE
MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 333, 348 (2d ed. 2000).
25
Daubert II, 43 F.3d at 1320–21. The highest relative risk values for Bendectin and limb
reduction birth defects stated in Daubert II were 1.6–1.7. Carl F. Cranor et al., Judicial Boundary
Drawing and the Need for Content-Sensitive Science in Toxic Torts After Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 16 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 37–38 (1996).
26
Daubert II, 43 F.3d at 1321 (quoting DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 958
(3d Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
27
Daubert II, 43 F.3d at 1321.
28
Id. at 1322 (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570, 576 (S.D. Ca.
1989), aff’d, 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated, 506 U.S. 579 (1993)).
29
Id.
21
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courts would adopt reasoning similar to Daubert II in handling their
gatekeeping review of epidemiologic evidence.
In one influential example, the U.S. District Court in Oregon addressed
epidemiologic risk studies in the context of silicone breast implant
litigation in Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.30 In Hall, the court reviewed
extensive epidemiologic studies that had concluded the relative risk for
silicone gel breast implants and connective tissue disease was no higher
than 1.24.31 The court then cited Daubert II regarding relative risk and the
2.0 standard: “[f]or an epidemiological study to show causation under a
preponderance standard, the relative risk of [the condition at issue] arising
from the epidemiological data . . . will, at a minimum, have to exceed
‘2’.”32 Since the epidemiologic studies in question demonstrated a relative
risk no higher than 1.24, the court concluded that the studies would not
support a conclusion that the plaintiff’s diseases were “more likely than
not” caused by the silicone implants.33 The court even chastised the expert
who attempted to testify regarding causation, stating that “[t]his is exactly
the type of ‘junk science’ that the Supreme Court in Daubert I commanded
courts to exclude.”34 As a result, the plaintiff’s injury claim for the silicone
implants would not proceed, as “Daubert I and Daubert II and their
progeny command this disposition.”35
Similar analysis occurred outside the Ninth Circuit.36 In Allison v.
McGhan Medical Corp., the Eleventh Circuit relied on both Daubert II and
Hall in addressing epidemiologic evidence in a silicone breast implant
case.37 The court noted that the epidemiologic data regarding silicone
breast implants and connective tissue diseases showed a relative risk of no
greater than 1.24, and then affirmed the trial court’s finding that the studies
were inadequate to prove causation.38 As a result of this determination,
and through analysis and rejection of other data on causation, the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed summary judgment as granted by the district court.39
Similar district court decisions requiring epidemiologic studies to reach a

30

Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1392, 1404 (D. Or. 1996).
Id. at 1404–05 & n.37.
32
Id. at 1403 (quoting Daubert II, 43 F.3d at 1321 (internal quotation marks omitted)).
33
Id. at 1405 (internal quotation marks omitted).
34
Id. at 1405 n.39.
35
Id. at 1415. For a detailed analysis of the Hall case, see Lucinda M. Finley, Guarding the Gate
to the Courthouse: How Trial Judges Are Using Their Evidentiary Screening Role to Remake Tort
Causation Rules, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 335, 352–56 (1999).
36
For a detailed list of cases examining this issue, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 28 cmt.
c(4), note (Proposed Final Draft 2005).
37
Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1316 (11th Cir. 1999).
38
Id. at 1315 n.16, 1316.
39
Id. at 1321–22.
31
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doubling-of-the-risk standard before being admitted occurred in diverse
jurisdictions evaluating many different toxicity claims.40
Doubling-of-the-risk methodology for review of epidemiologic
evidence developed shortly after Daubert, and provided defendants a
powerful argument for summary judgment in cases lacking relative risks
over 2.0.
C. Scientific Commentary on the Doubling-of-the-Risk Controversy
While the doubling-of-the-risk standard was not universally applied,41
epidemiologists quickly reacted to Daubert II and its progeny. These
commentators rejected the courts’ analyses of the epidemiologic evidence,
pointing out potential errors in these case opinions.
Much of the criticism involved the doubling-of-the-risk standard
failing to represent what the courts thought it represented. The perception
of a bright-line rule in the doubling-of-the-risk standard relied heavily on
assumptions regarding other factors used by epidemiologists, assumptions
about the use of population level statistics with specific plaintiffs, and
policy choices unrelated to science. Each criticism must be addressed
separately.
Doubling-of-the-risk methodology does have the potential to address
the probability of injury, but only under extremely limited circumstances
without additional complicating factors. In the example of birth defects
and medication, as seen in Daubert II, the risk assessment works so long as
all women respond identically to the medicine, and the toxic agent has no

40
Regarding breast implants, see, e.g., Pozefsky v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., No.
92CV0314LEKRWS, 2001 WL 967608, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2001) (citing In re Breast Implant
Litig., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1226 (D. Colo. 1998)); Grant v. Bristol-Myers Squibb, 97 F. Supp. 2d 986,
992 (D. Ariz. 2000) (citing Allison, 184 F.3d 1300); Daubert II, 43 F.3d 1311, 1320 (9th Cir. 1995); In
re Breast Implant Litig., 11 F. Supp. 2d at 1226 (citing Daubert II, 43 F.3d at 1321; Hall, 947 F. Supp.
at 1398).
Regarding pharmaceutical cases, see, e.g., Kelley v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 68 Fed. Cl.
84, 92 (2005) (quoting Kelley v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 02-223V, 2005 WL 1125671, at
*5 (Fed. Cl. Mar. 17, 2005), rev’d on other grounds, 68 Fed. Cl. 84 (2005)) (explaining that
epidemiology must show relative risk greater than two to provide evidence of causation); Burton v.
Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 513 F. Supp. 2d 719, 730 (N.D. Tex. 2007) (citing Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v.
Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 717–18 (Tex. 1997)); In re W.R. Grace & Co., 355 B.R. 462, 483 (Bankr. D.
Del. 2006) (citing Daubert II, 43 F.3d at 1320).
Regarding other substances, see, e.g., Cotroneo v. Shaw Envtl. & Infrastructure, Inc., No. H-051250, 2007 WL 3145791, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 25, 2007) (citing Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 717)
(discussing radioactive material); Sanderson v. Int’l Flavors & Fragrances, Inc., 950 F. Supp. 981, 1004
(C.D. Cal. 1996) (citing Daubert II, 43 F.3d at 1320–22) (discussing perfume and cologne).
This is not merely a federal court phenomenon. See, e.g., Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 717 (citing
Daubert II, 43 F.3d at 1321) (finding the doubling-of-the-risk requirement persuasive). Havner does
hedge on the point, however, noting that this will not be considered a litmus test. Id. at 718.
41
See discussion infra Part II.D.
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effect on other causes of the disease. The methodology fails to recognize
the differentiation between individuals with higher or lower overall
exposure.43 It fails to recognize the difficulties caused by a particular
individual’s sensitivity to the toxic agent.44
Another factor that
complicates the extrapolation of relative risk ratio to causation involves the
complication of scientific assessment because of late-occurring disease,
following the initial outbreak or study.45 Finally, and by no means
exhaustively, epidemiologists noted that confusion among definitions of
which cases of disease were to be included in mathematical modeling also
affected risk calculations.46
As a result of these complicating factors escaping the judicial opinions,
use of doubling-of-the-risk methodology provides a false sense of pure
objective analysis lacking subjective input resulting from additional factor
assessment.47
Another major criticism leveled against the doubling-of-the-risk
assessment is that while it may be helpful in the determination of
population-level risks, it fails as a useful tool in evaluating the risks to any
particular plaintiff. Relative risk is the incidence ratio of an exposed
population to the disease in an unexposed but otherwise similar
population.48 Professor of Epidemiology Sander Greenland notes plainly
that “[a]ll epidemiologic measures (such as rate ratios and rate fractions)
reflect only the net impact of exposure on a population.”49 Measures like
relative risk therefore simply do not address the causation of disease in any
specific person: “Population-wide risk estimates simply do not address,
and thus cannot be translated to, the probability of causation in any one
individual.”50
42

Beyea & Berger, supra note 1, at 353.
Cranor et al., supra note 25, at 39–40.
44
Id.; see also Sander Greenland, Relation of Probability of Causation to Relative Risk and
Doubling Dose: A Methodologic Error that Has Become a Social Problem, 89 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 1166, 1168 (1999) [hereinafter Greenland, Methodologic Error].
45
Russellyn S. Carruth & Bernard D. Goldstein, Relative Risk Greater than Two in Proof of
Causation in Toxic Tort Litigation, 41 JURIMETRICS J. 195, 207 (2001).
46
Greenland, Methodologic Error, supra note 44, at 1168 (noting that interchangeable use of
terms such as etiologic fraction, attributable risk, and probability of causation often results in
underestimations of the probability of causation).
47
Beyea & Berger, supra note 1, at 356.
48
Green et al., supra note 24, at 348.
49
Greenland, Methodologic Error, supra note 44, at 1168 (emphasis added).
50
Finley, supra note 35, at 352–58; see also Greenland, Methodologic Error, supra note 44, at
1168 (discussing variations within a population); Joseph V. Rodricks & Susan H. Rieth, Toxicological
Risk Assessment in the Courtroom: Are Available Methodologies Suitable for Evaluating Toxic Tort
and Product Liability Claims?, 27 REG. TOXICOLOGY & PHARMACOLOGY 21, 24–25 (1998) (“A
population risk can be said to apply to individuals in that population, but only if it is assumed that all
individuals are identical in respect of those characteristics . . . that have been assumed in the estimation
of risks.”).
43
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Because relative risk fails to apply to individual-level disease, the use
of the relative risk number as the sine qua non of toxic tort causation
appears misguided as a scientific principle.51
Finally, scientific commentary criticizes the doubling-of-the-risk case
law as representing underlying policy choices rather than a pure sciencebased limitation. Epidemiologist Dr. Jan Beyea and his co-author criticize
the doubling-of-the-risk standard as essentially raising the standard in
science-related cases from a preponderance standard to a standard above
beyond a reasonable doubt, partially due to unrealistic expectations by
judges.52 Other critics suggest that the debate over epidemiologic evidence
hides a deeper debate over policy choices including who should bear the
risk of harm from toxic exposure, wealth-shifting through tort, and the
judge and jury balance of power.53 At least one group even hypothesizes
that the standard may exist to benefit the intransigence of industry and to
close the courthouse door to plaintiffs.54 Others mention that while the
standard may deter plaintiffs due to the high burden, the doubling-of-therisk standard also has the effect of removing desirable deterrence in the
form of tort incentives for industry to develop safer products and perform
detailed research on products.55 All of these effects can disproportionately
51
Finley, supra note 35, at 348. Voluminous analysis discusses the doubling-of-the-risk standard,
and general and specific causation. See Michael D. Green, The Future of Proportional Responsibility,
in EXPLORING TORT LAW 352, 366–70 (M. Stuart Madden ed., 2005) (reviewing the debate of courts
and commentators on the 2.0 standard); Carruth & Goldstein, supra note 45, at 200–02 (reviewing
disparate judicial handling of the 2.0 standard).
Some see the 2.0 standard as not protective enough of the requirements of causation. While
discounting the use of relative risk itself as the sole method of determining causation, Freedman and
Stark argue that proof of causation in a specific case, even starting with a relative risk of four, was
“unconvincing.” David A. Freedman & Phillip B. Stark, The Swine Flu Vaccine and Guillain-Barré
Syndrome: A Case Study in Relative Risk and Specific Causation, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 49, 61
(2001) (citing Manko v. United States, 636 F. Supp. 1419, 1437 (W.D. Mo. 1986), aff’d in part, 830
F.2d 831 (8th Cir. 1987) (noting a relative risk of 3.89–3.92)); see also Bert Black & David Lilienfeld,
Epidemiologic Proof in Toxic Tort Litigation, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 732, 769 (1984) (arguing evidence
is insufficient to establish causal link without “data that reasonably indicate a relative risk greater than
2”); Andrew W. Jurs, Daubert, Probabilities and Possibilities, and the Ohio Solution: A Sensible
Approach to Relevance Under Rule 702 in Civil and Criminal Applications, 41 AKRON L. REV. 609,
637 (2008) (considering effect on jury and noting less than 2.0 may be inviting speculation).
52
Beyea & Berger, supra note 1, at 358–59. Beyea and Berger are not the sole authors to
recognize this phenomenon. See, e.g., Cranor et al., supra note 25, at 61.
53
Cranor et al., supra note 25, at 61; see also Peter White, A Relative Risk 2.0: The Ninth Circuit
Revisits Daubert’s Epidemiological Standard in In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litigation, 13 S.E.
ENVTL. L.J. 33, 65–66 (2004) (“Judges usurp the jury’s function when they effectively dismiss claims
based on what typically are considered factual issues [such as the 2.0 standard in Daubert II].”).
54
David Egilman et al., Proving Causation: The Use and Abuse of Medical and Scientific
Evidence Inside the Courtroom—An Epidemilogist’s Critique of the Judicial Interpretation of the
Daubert Ruling, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 223, 231 (2003).
55
Finley, supra note 35, at 363–73; see also Thomas O. McGarity, Proposal for Linking
Culpability and Causation to Ensure Corporate Accountability for Toxic Risks, 26 WM. & MARY
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 38 (2001).
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impact racial minorities or women, who have traditionally received less
research focus.56
All of these policy choices underlying the epidemiologic risk
assessment debate involve important societal implications, but have less to
do with the analysis of science methodologies and content, which were the
intended focus of Daubert gatekeeping.
Scientific reaction to Daubert II and other similar case analyses of
epidemiologic risk assessment in toxic tort litigation addressed in detail the
underlying assumptions of the 2.0 standard used by the courts, the
limitations of relative risk in causation, and the other potentially
conflicting issues getting caught in the debate over scientific admissibility.
D. Other Courts Reject the 2.0 Standard, Before, and After Daubert II
While the Ninth and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeal adopted the
doubling-of-the-risk standard after Daubert,57 other U.S. courts of appeals
did not mandate a bright-line approach. Several opinions before 2000
rejected the Daubert II approach, and by 2002 the Ninth Circuit had an
opportunity to re-evaluate its adherence to the doubling-of-the-risk
standard.
In the same year as the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Daubert II, the
Second Circuit addressed epidemiologic risk analysis in In re Joint Eastern
& Southern District Asbestos Litigation.58 In this case, the district court
excluded certain epidemiologic studies as failing to establish a strong
enough connection between the asbestos exposure and colon cancer.59
While the district court noted that proof of causation could be established
by studies showing a doubling-of-the-risk, or by studies with less than
double the risk in addition to other evidence, the judge rejected studies
under 2.0.60 On appeal, the Second Circuit rejected the district court’s
bright-line approach to the studies on the issue of risk ratio, stating the
court was “reluctant to adopt such an approach.”61 Rather, the appellate
court would hold the district court to the standard of its own
pronouncements, allowing less than double the risk epidemiologic data
along with other materials to suffice to prove causation.62 As a result, the
court reversed the district court’s directed verdict on the issue of causation,
56

Finley, supra note 35, at 373–74.
See supra notes 26, 37 and accompanying text.
58
52 F.3d 1124 (2d Cir. 1995).
59
In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 827 F. Supp. 1014, 1043 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), aff’d in part
and rev’d in part, 52 F.3d 1127 (2d Cir. 1995).
60
Id.
61
In re Joint E. & S., 52 F.3d at 1134.
62
See id. (stating a preference for the district court to instruct the jury on the science and then let
the jury weigh the studies).
57
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but in doing so also rejected the formalism of the recently issued Daubert
II.63
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia would first address
epidemiologic risk while specifically addressing the doubling-of-the-risk
methodology of Daubert II, in the decision in Ambrosini v. Labarraque.64
The court specifically noted that the Ninth Circuit’s formulation for
relative risk assessment requires an opinion that risk had more than
doubled.65 However, the court rebuffed the Daubert II standard by stating
that the epidemiologist’s testimony regarding birth defects and
pharmaceuticals “does not warrant exclusion simply because it fails to
establish the causal link to a specified degree of probability.”66 While the
court conceded that the testimony itself may be insufficient to carry the
burden of proof on causation, the evidence remained admissible because it
might assist the jury in finding whether the chemical caused the injuries.67
As a result, the court reiterated that the epidemiologist’s opinions on birth
defects and pharmaceutical drugs were admissible under Federal Rule of
Evidence 702.68 The Ambrosini decision openly questioned the Daubert II
approach, and created a split in the U.S. courts of appeals’ approaches to
epidemiologic risk analysis.
In 1999, just as Daubert II’s doubling-of-the-risk analysis gained
support with the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Allison, the non-doubling
approach would garner additional support after Ambrosini (and In re Joint
Eastern & Southern). The Third Circuit analyzed complex epidemiologic
data regarding nuclear radiation exposure in In re TMI Litigation.69 In this
case, scientific analysis evaluated the increased risk of cancer after the
radiation exposure, and determined that an exposure of ten rems would
equal the “doubling dose” for an exposed individual.70 At the district court
level, Judge Rambo determined that the plaintiffs would have to show
radiation exposure of ten rems to each plaintiff in order to succeed in
establishing causation.71 As with the Ambrosini case, the court of appeals
rejected the bright-line approach of the doubling dose requirements, and
63
Id. at 1139. In re Joint E. & S. does not mention Daubert II in the April 6, 1995, opinion,
although Daubert II had been issued several months prior on January 4, 1995. Id.; Daubert II, 43 F.3d
1311, 1315 (9th Cir. 1995).
64
101 F.3d 129, 135 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
65
Id. at 135 n.8.
66
Id. at 135.
67
Id. at 136.
68
Id. at 135–36.
69
193 F.3d 613, 629 (3d Cir. 1999), amended by 199 F.3d 158 (3d Cir. 2000).
70
See In re TMI Litig., 927 F. Supp. 834, 845, 864–66 (M.D. Pa. 1996), aff’d, 89 F.3d 1106 (3d
Cir. 1996), and aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 193 F.3d 613 (3d Cir. 1999), and amended by 199 F.3d
158 (3d Cir. 2000) (stating that a dose below ten rems is insufficient to infer more likely than not the
existence of a causal link).
71
In re TMI Litig., 927 F. Supp. at 866–67.
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overturned the summary judgment granted against some plaintiffs.72 The
In re TMI Litigation case established a break with prior Third Circuit
precedent, particularly In re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litigation, which
previously interpreted Daubert, along with the preponderance burden of
proof, as requiring all expert opinions to rise to the level of probabilities.73
The Third Circuit was not the sole U.S. appellate court reconsidering
prior analysis on this issue. In the decision issued in In re Hanford
Nuclear Reservation Litigation, the Ninth Circuit directly addressed its
analysis of relative risk from Daubert II and rejected the formalism of its
prior approach.74 In the decision, the court assessed the Daubert II
reasoning, but adopted the language of the Third Circuit from In re TMI
Litigation: “We agree with the Third Circuit that the validity of a claim
should not depend on whether a plaintiff was exposed to a fraction of a rem
lower than the ‘doubling dose.’”75 As a result, the court found error in the
district court’s determination that the epidemiologic evidence would have
to show a relative risk exceeding 2.0 to be admitted.76 Following In re
Hanford, courts in the Ninth Circuit had a clear mandate to rethink the
doubling-of-the-risk requirement of Daubert II.77
Additional case law outside the Third and Ninth Circuits demonstrates
similar trends. In 2006, the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado
addressed epidemiologic evidence in the case of Cook v. Rockwell
International Corp.78 The U.S. District Court in Colorado had in 1998
adopted the Daubert II doubling-of-the-risk requirement on epidemiologic
72
In re TMI Litig., 193 F.3d at 727. The summary judgment order affected plaintiffs who had not
proceeded to trial, as the “Trial Plaintiffs” had proceeded on a theory of the case that all had received at
least that dose of exposure. Id.
73
In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 751–52 (3d Cir. 1994). In re Paoli does not
appear to require a “doubling-of-the-risk” standard per se, and the case occurred before Daubert II so it
does not address the Daubert II formulation. See id. (requiring expert opinions to rise to a reasonable
degree of certainty). However, as most courts agree that doubling-of-the-risk equals the preponderance
of the evidence standard, In re Paoli is consistent with the Daubert II decision. Daubert II, 43 F.3d
1311, 1321 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that to show preponderance, risk ratio must exceed 2.0); see also
Green et al., supra note 24, at 384 (“The threshold for concluding that an agent was more likely than
not the cause of an individual’s disease is a relative risk greater than 2.0.”).
At least one district court decision in the Third Circuit, which cites both In re Paoli and In re TMI
Litigation, affirmed that the doubling-of-the-risk standard would not be a “password to a finding of
causation,” rejecting the “mere conclusion-oriented selection process.” Magistrini v. One Hour
Martinizing Dry Cleaning, 180 F. Supp. 2d 584, 605 n.27, 606–07 (D.N.J. 2002), aff’d 68 Fed. App’x
356 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Landrigan v. Celotex Corp., 605 A.2d 1079, 1087 (N.J. 1992)).
74
In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 292 F.3d 1124, 1136–37 (9th Cir. 2002). The
companion case to In re Hanford is In re Berg Litigation, decided on the same day and based on the
same analysis as In re Hanford. In re Berg Litig., 293 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2002).
75
In re Hanford, 292 F.3d at 1137.
76
Id.
77
For an example of a case decided in the same year but before In re Hanford, see Ferguson v.
Riverside Sch. Dist. No. 416, No. CS-00-0097-FVS, 2002 WL 34355958 (E.D. Wash. Feb. 6, 2002).
78
580 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1088–89 (D. Colo. 2006).
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evidence in the decision In re Breast Implant Litigation. In addressing
the connection between radiation from the Rocky Flats nuclear weapons
plant and cancer incidence, the Cook court determined that the Daubert II
requirement for admissibility of epidemiologic evidence “confuses the
threshold question of whether an expert’s evidence is admissible with the
separate question of whether it is sufficient to prove a particular point.”80
In so finding, the district court rejected its prior use of the Daubert II
standard by adoption of the non-2.0 standard.
This is not solely a federal phenomenon. In In re Lockheed Litigation
Cases,81 a California Court of Appeals addressed epidemiologic studies in
a case involving chemical exposure in the workplace and disease
incidence.82 Of note, the California court would use the standard of
causation for California that is identical to the standard used for the
Daubert II ruling.83 Even under the same standard of causation, the court
in Lockheed rejected the imposition of the doubling-of-the-risk standard,
noting: “[A] court cannot exclude an epidemiological study from
consideration solely because the study shows a relative risk of less than
2.0.”84
Appellate courts rejected a bright-line doubling-of-the-risk approach
around the same time as Daubert II, in In re Joint Eastern & Southern
Asbestos Litigation and Ambrosini.85 During the next seven years, the
Third Circuit’s rejection of the In re Paoli analysis in In re TMI Litigation
and the Ninth Circuit’s re-evaluation of epidemiologic standard in In re
Hanford provided evidence of a profound switch in analysis.86
The profound disagreement between the courts addressing
epidemiologic risk evidence in the immediate aftermath of Daubert, and
the later re-evaluation of the issues by some of those courts, indicate that
79
In re Breast Implant Litig., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1226 (D. Colo. 1998) (citing Daubert II, 43
F.3d 1311, 1321 (9th Cir. 1995); Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1398 (D. Or.
1996)).
80
Cook, 580 F. Supp. 2d at 1083 n.8, 1084 (citing Daubert II, 43 F.3d at 1315). The Cook court
also cited papers by epidemiologists Sander Greenland and David Egilman et al., both of which address
concerns on court use/misuse of epidemiology and statistics. Id. at 1102–03; see also Greenland,
Critical Appraisal, supra note 2, at 297–301; Egilman et al., supra note 54, at 236–41.
81
23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 762 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005).
82
Lockheed Litig., 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 765. The diseases alleged included brain, liver, and kidney
damage. Appellants’ Opening Brief at 2, Lockheed Litig., 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 762 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005)
(No. B166347), 2003 WL 23281037.
83
Lockheed Litig., 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 777 (citing Daubert II, 43 F.3d at 1320).
84
Id. at 778.
85
Ambrosini v. Labarraque, 101 F.3d 129, 135–36 (D.C. Cir. 1996); In re Joint E. & S. Dist.
Asbestos Litig., 52 F.3d 1124, 1134 (2d Cir. 1995).
86
In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 292 F.3d 1124, 1137 (9th Cir. 2002); In re TMI
Litig., 193 F.3d 613, 727 (3d Cir. 1999), amended by 199 F.3d 158 (3d Cir. 2000); see also Cook v.
Rockwell Int’l Corp., 580 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1083 n.8, 1084 (D. Colo. 2006) (adopting a reasonable
certainty standard of causation).
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judges have been either confused or inconsistent on complex
epidemiologic evidence. As a result, the doubling-of-the-risk controversy
provides an outstanding example of judicial handling of complex science.
E. Why Is This a Good “Test Case” for Science in the Courtroom?
Independent of the inconsistent handling of epidemiologic risk
assessment by appellate circuits and district courts, several attributes of the
relative risk controversy add to its usefulness as an example of complex or
cutting-edge science in the courtroom.
These features include
epidemiologic research as a field of scientific analysis involving significant
complexity, epidemiology as a relatively young scientific discipline
lacking consensus within the field on its use in torts, and epidemiologic
proof as the sole method of proving causation for certain cases.
1. Epidemiology as a Scientific Field Containing Areas of Significant
Complexity
Epidemiology is a field of scientific research that contains areas of
highly complex and specialized analysis. As a result, some judicial
interpretation of epidemiology using the Daubert analysis comes out of a
desire to seek clarity from confusion. But in doing so, the courts miss
subtleties about the science that cast doubt on the proposition that judicial
interpretations represent what the courts intend.
Clearly the responsibility of a district court screening the most detailed
and complex research in epidemiology is a difficult task. The In re Joint
Eastern & Southern court noted that sufficiency of proof in epidemiologic
evidence cases “poses unique difficulties for trial courts.”87 The United
States Supreme Court in Daubert had previously declared that judges
would “possess the capacity to undertake” this difficult task, although the
Ninth Circuit disagreed as well, calling the review of epidemiology in
Daubert II “uncomfortable” and “daunting.”88
The opinions of Judge Jones in Hall and Judge Sparr in In re Breast
Implant Litigation demonstrate courts reviewing complex epidemiologic
studies but focusing mostly on relative risk ratios.89 Each judge evaluated
a series of epidemiologic studies, but then focused most of their attention
on the relative risk number of 1.24 from a published study on breast

87

In re Joint E. & S., 52 F.3d at 1133.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993); Daubert II, 43 F.3d 1311,
1315–16 (9th Cir. 1995); see supra notes 13–15 and accompanying text (summarizing Daubert
decisions).
89
In re Breast Implant Litig., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1221, 1225–29 (D. Colo. 1998); Hall v. Baxter
Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1391, 1403–05 (D. Or. 1996).
88
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implant illnesses. In these cases, judges missed or rejected analysis of
complicating factors in the field which lessen the overall importance of
relative risk ratios in declaring cause for an individual plaintiff.91
Epidemiology is the science of evaluating whether a particular
exposure caused a particular disease.92 Relative risk is one indicator
epidemiologists may use in their evaluation of causation, but alone it
serves only to show an association rather than cause.93 To go from
association to a causal connection, an epidemiologist analyzes multiple
other factors in testing the validity of association.94 Only after a detailed
analysis of all factors may the expert form a final conclusion about whether
the causative effect has been proven.95
As a highly complex science, judges untrained in science, and the
lawyers in their courtrooms, will be less skillful in the field than
practitioners. Granting judicial oversight authority on science must come
with the recognition that judges may be ill-suited to the task.96
Epidemiology provides one dramatic example of the difficulties judges
have with complex science in the courtroom, and through this example the
need for reform becomes clearer.97
2.

No Consensus Among Epidemiologists on Tort Applications of
Their Research

The field of epidemiology is a relative newcomer to the scientific
research community, when compared to more established and recognized
fields like medicine or engineering. As a result, the epidemiology
90
Hall, 947 F. Supp. at 1404–05 (citing Charles H. Hennekens et al., Self-Reported Breast
Implants and Connective-Tissue Diseases in Female Health Professionals, 275 JAMA 616, 616 (1996)
(showing a 1.24 relative risk of breast implants to connective tissue diseases)); In re Breast Implant
Litig., 11 F. Supp. 2d at 1227 (reviewing the same study).
91
Finley, supra note 35, at 352–62.
92
Green et al., supra note 24, at 374; see generally KENNETH J. ROTHMAN ET AL., MODERN
EPIDEMIOLOGY (3d ed. 2008).
93
See Green et al., supra note 24, at 348, 376 (“Relative risk measures the strength of the
association.”); see also Greenland, Methodologic Error, supra note 44, at 1166 (“[P]robability of
causation cannot be computed solely from the relative risk.”); Melissa Moore Thompson, Comment,
Causal Inference in Epidemiology: Implications for Toxic Tort Litigation, 71 N.C. L. REV. 247, 256,
263–64 (1992) (noting that causation cannot be determined solely from mathematics).
94
Green et al., supra note 24, at 375–76; Austin Bradford Hill, The Environment and Disease:
Association or Causation?, 58 PROC. ROYAL SOC’Y MED. 295, 295–99 (1965) (setting forth nine
factors to evaluate in determining causation). For commentary on the influence of the Bradford Hill
factors in determining cause, see Egilman et al., supra note 54, at 241 (“Hill’s considerations are well
accepted and have been widely used by epistemologists.”); Thompson, supra note 93, at 266–67
(stating that the Bradford Hill criteria are widely used by epidemiologists to determine causation).
95
See Finley, supra note 35, at 359–63 (reviewing the different factors epidemiologists use in
forming a judgment on causation); Thompson, supra note 93, at 267.
96
See discussion infra Part III.A.
97
See discussion infra Part IV.
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presented in the courtroom lacks a critical component of other scientific
fields which judges can rely upon: consensus within the field on the
application of the research to tort or other legal use. As a result, judges
find themselves instituting standards on scientific endeavors, like in the
doubling-of-the-risk controversy.
In a field of established scientific research like medicine, courts face
several advantages in making Daubert determinations.
First, the
parameters of the field of medicine are more commonly understood by
laypersons, partially as a consequence of the age of the discipline but also
from individual experiences with a physician.98
Second, professional associations in medicine have developed some
generally accepted standards for the presentation of expert testimony in the
courtroom.99 For example, physicians testifying in a tort case will
understand that a key component will be whether the care was within or
outside the “standard of care.”100 While physicians may differ on the
conclusion, the framework for the analysis is well understood and
relatively clear. Finally, the medical profession has worked together with
the legal profession in forming joint committees to draft interprofessional
codes of formalized standards for expert witnesses, like the American
Medical Association (“AMA”)–American Bar Association (“ABA”)

98
Larry A. Green et al., The Ecology of Medical Care Revisited, 344 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2021,
2023 (2001) (stating that in a typical month, over twenty percent of adults in the United States visit a
physician); Eric W. Nawar et al., U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., National Hospital Ambulatory
Medical Care Survey, in ADVANCE DATA FROM VITAL AND HEALTH STATISTICS, NO. 386, at 1, 2
(2007) (noting 115.3 million emergency room visits in the United States in 2005, for a population of
296 million); see also, Minnesota v. Brom, 463 N.W.2d 758, 767–68 (Minn. 1990) (Wahl, J.,
dissenting) (reviewing studies showing one of three Americans has sought or has had a family member
seek help from a psychiatrist or psychologist).
99
HEALTH AND ETHICS POLICIES OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION HOUSE OF
DELEGATES §§ 265.992 (Expert Witness Testimony), 265.994 (Expert Witness Testimony—Clinical
Issues), 265.995 (Guidelines for Expert Witness), 265.997 (AMA-ABA Statement on Interprofessional
Relations for Physicians and Attorneys), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ad-com/polfind/HlthEthics.pdf. While aspirational, these guidelines serve as a reminder of a proposed minimal standard for
expert witness conduct and ethics, and represent the involvement of the profession in standardizing
legal application of the science. See Aaron S. Kesselheim & David M. Studdert, Role of Professional
Organizations in Regulating Physician Expert Witness Testimony, 298 JAMA 2907, 2909 (2007) (“The
increase in extrajudicial regulation of physicians in their capacity as expert witnesses . . . is
unmistakable.”).
100
See, e.g., James A. Henderson, Jr. & John A. Siliciano, Universal Health Care and the
Continued Reliance on Custom in Determining Medical Malpractice, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1382, 1384
(1994) (“The central legal task in . . . a medical malpractice suit, is to determine the standard of care . . .
[using] the customary practices of the medical profession as the benchmark of acceptable behavior.”);
Theodore Silver, One Hundred Years of Harmful Error: The Historical Jurisprudence of Medical
Malpractice, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1193, 1212–13 (1992) (noting that custom-based standard of care
defines physician duty). Certain commentators see a trend of courts shifting away from custom-based
standards of care. See, e.g., Phillip G. Peters, Jr., The Quiet Demise of Deference to Custom:
Malpractice Law at the Millennium, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 163, 164 (2000).
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Statement on Interprofessional Relations for Physicians and Attorneys.
Through more generalized consensus, a field of science like medicine can
create for itself certain standards for legal use of the science, thus relieving
the court of the burden of implementing those standards on an unfamiliar
field.
Epidemiology lacks the structures that assist judges in these more
established fields. First, most citizens or judges have little experience
dealing with epidemiologic analysis, and the concepts in expert
epidemiologic testimony are difficult.102 Second, the field of epidemiology
lacks inherent standards for tort legal use. Epidemiology developed
largely in the area of regulatory law, regarding questions of populationlevel risks from exposures to toxic agents.103 Noted epidemiologist Dr.
Joseph Rodricks and his coauthor observe that within the regulatory
application of epidemiology, “many methodological concepts are clear and
reasonably well accepted. This is not at all the case regarding the issues
that arise in tort and product liability cases.”104 The result is that debates
over epidemiologic methodology occur within the courtroom with the
judge as the referee, rather than outside the heated context of an individual
case.105 Finally, there is little interprofessional involvement of the
communities of the type exemplified by the AMA and ABA.106 All of
these factors combine to leave judges as the arbiters of the legal application
of complex science, but only within a single case and without systematic
guidance.
The fact that the field of epidemiology is relatively new to science, has
focused more on the regulatory application of the discipline, and lacks
interprofessional codes for tort legal use, results in judges making
fundamental rules about application of the science within the courtroom to
a much greater extent than in more established fields. As with the
fundamental complexity of the field, this scenario results in an important
test case on the limits of judicial decision making in the Daubert regime.

101
HEALTH AND ETHICS POLICIES OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION HOUSE OF
DELEGATES, supra note 99, § 265.997. Joint interprofessional committees are common on the state and
local level as well. See Andrew W. Jurs, The Rationale for Expert Immunity or Liability Exposure and
Case Law Since Briscoe: Reasserting Immunity Protection for Friendly Expert Witnesses, 38 U. MEM.
L. REV. 49, 90–91 n.232 (2008) (listing state and local interprofessional organizations and codes).
102
Neil Vidmar & Shari Seidman Diamond, Juries and Expert Evidence, 66 BROOK. L. REV.
1121, 1146–48 (2001) (reviewing studies evaluating jury confusion regarding epidemiologic evidence);
see also In re Welding Fume Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1-03-CV-17000, 2005 WL 1868046, at *34 n.78
(N.D. Ohio Aug. 8, 2005) (recognizing that epidemiology evidence challenges jurors with complex
issues of methodology). For additional discussion on this issue, see infra Part III.A.
103
Rodricks & Rieth, supra note 50, at 23, 31.
104
Id. at 31.
105
Id.
106
Id.
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3. Epidemiology Alone as Evidence of Causation in Toxic Tort Cases
In addition to the fundamental complexity of the field and the lack of
standards for tort legal use, a third factor also contributes to the example of
epidemiology as a good test case for the application of the Daubert
standard to science: the use of epidemiologic analysis as the sole method
for proof of the causation element in complex tort cases.
In establishing a claim for toxic exposure, a critical connection for the
jury to make will involve the connection between exposure to a chemical
and a particular disease of the plaintiff. Randomized experimental studies
with a control group are the ideal type of study to measure the relationship
between exposure and disease.107 The Food and Drug Administration
requires these randomized controlled studies in making determinations of
whether a new drug is “safe and effective” under federal law.108
Controlled studies are not ethical for harmful agents, however.109
Without the controlled randomized studies, and in the absence of
advanced knowledge on the molecular and biologic pathology of the
disease course, epidemiologic studies by a trained researcher must provide
the evidence of a causal link.110 The studies will evaluate the health
outcomes in a population and compare the substances to similar
chemicals.111 Then, a trained epidemiologist may develop an informed, but
necessarily subjective, conclusion on causation.112
As a result of the inability to perform other studies, and the lack of
more definitive biological or pathological evidence of causation, the
epidemiologist’s analysis and informed opinion will provide the court with
the main, or sole, evidence on the issue of causation.113 With the causal
connection resting in epidemiologic proof alone, the courts must assess
these studies in isolation. Consequently, the studies are indispensable to
plaintiffs in toxic tort litigation.114 More succinctly, the initial Federal
Judicial Center Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence (“Reference
Manual”) noted: “In the absence of an understanding of the biological and

107

Green et al., supra note 24, at 338.
21 U.S.C. § 355 (2009); 21 C.F.R. § 312.21 (2009).
109
Green et al., supra note 24, at 339.
110
Beyea & Berger, supra note 1, at 355–56.
111
Mark Geistfeld, Scientific Uncertainty and Causation in Tort Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1011,
1012 (2001).
112
Beyea & Berger, supra note 1, at 356–57; Green, supra note 51, at 375.
113
Martin L. Norton, The Physician Expert Witness and the U.S. Supreme Court—An
Epidemiologic Approach, 21 MED. & L. 435, 440–41 (2002).
114
Michel F. Baumeister & Dorothea M. Capone, Admissibility Standards as Politics—The
Imperial Gate Closers Arrive!!!, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1025, 1032 (2003); see also In re Joint E. &
S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 827 F. Supp. 1014, 1026–28 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (describing the usefulness of
epidemiological evidence).
108
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pathological mechanisms by which disease develops, epidemiological
evidence is the most valid type of scientific evidence of toxic causation.”115
Following the Reference Manual affirming the importance of
epidemiologic studies in the absence of other methods of causation, courts
would adopt similar language. In In re Breast Implant Litigation, Judge
Sparr wrote: “Epidemiology is the best evidence of causation in the mass
torts context.”116 In a drug tort case, Hollander v. Sandoz Pharmaceuticals
Corp., Judge Thompson cited both the Reference Manual and Judge Sparr
for the proposition that the epidemiologic evidence would be “the most
valid type of scientific evidence of toxic causation.”117
Because of its crucial role in toxic torts, and because of its isolation in
establishing causation in the absence of other definitive studies, courts
evaluating epidemiology in toxic tort cases handle complex, but similar,
fact questions at the cutting-edge of science. The test cases provide a
sample of judges dealing with similar cases, similar issues, and even
identical scientists, showing how the judiciary as a whole handles the most
difficult Daubert challenges.
4. Result
With a combination of these factors—the complexity, the lack of
standards within the profession for tort-legal use, and the use of
epidemiology alone to prove causation—courts reach the outer limits of
their capacity to make difficult gatekeeping determinations under Daubert.
Inconsistent handling of the evidence appears as one result.118 However,
the combination of these factors makes the judicial handling of
epidemiologic risk analysis a “test case” for the Daubert regime, and
exposes difficulties that can be anticipated for future Rule 702 reviews.
III. EPIDEMIOLOGIC RISK CASES SHOW WEAKNESSES IN JUDICIAL
HANDLING OF SCIENCE
Since Daubert, the epidemiologic risk assessment controversy cases
demonstrate judges’ treatment of complex cutting-edge epidemiologic
science, thereby providing a discrete group of opinions on which the
judicial ability to handle complex science can be assessed. Evaluating the

115
Linda A. Bailey et al., Reference Guide on Epidemiology, in FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE
MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 121, 126 (1st ed. 1994) (emphasis added).
116
In re Breast Implant Litig., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1224 (D. Colo. 1998) (citing Bailey et al.,
supra note 115, at 126).
117
Hollander v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 95 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1235 n.14 (W.D. Okla. 2000), aff’d in
part, 289 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2002) (quoting In re Breast Implant Litig., 11 F. Supp. 2d at 1224;
Bailey et al., supra note 115, at 126) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
118
See discussion supra Parts II.B.–D.
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judicial opinions in these cases demonstrates some of the weaknesses of
the Daubert regime.
Some of the difficulties seen in the epidemiologic risk controversy
include basic judicial knowledge of scientific processes, the judicial
handling of statistical/mathematical evidence, use of bright-line tests that
may not be scientifically sound, outlier enhancement of experts, and the
constraints of legal procedure on science. By evaluating each of these
difficulties, we can recognize inherent weaknesses in the judicial handling
of complex science in the epidemiologic risk controversy that may also
affect other cutting-edge scientific controversies subject to Daubert
review.
A. Judicial Knowledge of and Background with Scientific Principles
Epidemiologic risk case law shows judges evaluating extremely
complex science, in a field lacking consensus among researchers, when the
admissibility decision will either permit the plaintiff to proceed, or end the
case. Daubert anticipated that judges would be placed in this role.119 In
the epidemiologic risk controversy, judges are openly skeptical of their
abilities to analyze the epidemiologic evidence, but then must in detail
analyze the expert opinions on the science.120 Do judges have the skills to
make these decisions? Justice Stephen Breyer remains skeptical: “[M]ost
judges lack the scientific training that might facilitate the evaluation of
scientific claims or the evaluation of expert witnesses who make such
claims.”121
In evaluating the judicial capacity to analyze complex science, two
essential questions should be addressed: the scientific background of the
judiciary, and judicial familiarity with the essential components of the
scientific method. By reviewing the research on these issues, some doubt
in the Daubert assumption that judges “possess the capacity to undertake
this review” must be acknowledged.122
Two studies performed by social science researchers directly measured
the scientific background of judges.123 In a 2001 study, Sophia Gatowski
and her colleagues surveyed 400 state court judges to determine their
scientific backgrounds, their views on Daubert, and their knowledge of

119

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592–93 (1993).
E.g., Daubert II, 43 F.3d 1311, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995).
121
Stephen Breyer, Introduction to FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE 1, 4 (2d ed., 2000).
122
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.
123
See Sophia I. Gatowski et al., Asking the Gatekeepers: A National Survey of Judges on
Judging Expert Evidence in a Post-Daubert World, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 433, 435 (2001); Valerie
P. Hans, Judges, Juries, and Scientific Evidence, 16 J.L. & POL’Y 19, 19–21 (2007).
120
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124

scientific principles.
The results show that judges lack preparation for
their Daubert role.
When asked to discuss their educational training, 85% of judges had
some social science coursework in their past, while 77% had coursework in
the physical sciences, and 67% in biological sciences.125 Finally, while
some judges did get training in specific scientific areas, a vast majority
(96%) of those judges found the training lacking on the general scientific
methods and principles.126 In conclusion, judges split 52% to 48% on the
issue of whether they had enough science in their background to prepare
them for the complex issues handled under Daubert.127 As a result, the
Gatowski study shows that judges themselves question their experience to
make the tough calls necessary under Daubert.
Dr. Valerie Hans’s study involving judicial background sheds
additional light on this issue.128 Dr. Hans surveyed judges in order to
compare their reactions to juror responses in her study Judges, Juries, and
Scientific Evidence.129 By surveying sixty-five judges, all of whom
attended a “Science for Judges” conference, Hans provided additional
insight into judicial scientific background.130
In the Hans study, judges reported 10.29 classes from high school and
college in math and science, compared to the jurors’ average of 9.72.131
When compared to jurors with college degrees—who showed an average
of 14.04 classes—as opposed to the overall jury pool, judges showed a
significant deficit in math and science training.132 Of the sixty-five judges
surveyed, only five (7.7%) reported having some job experience with math
or science.133
Through the Gatowski and Hans studies, empirical research
demonstrates that the judiciary is poorly prepared to handle the difficult
scientific issues presented in courtrooms. Average jurors are not
statistically worse off than judges, and judges are deficient as compared to
a group of college-educated jurors.134 The judges themselves recognize

124

Gatowski et al., supra note 123, at 435.
Id. at 442. For a comparison of this data to the data from Dr. Hans’s study, see infra notes
131–32 and accompanying text.
126
Gatowski et al., supra note 123, at 442.
127
Id.
128
Hans, supra note 123, at 19–20.
129
Id. at 29.
130
Id. at 28.
131
Id. at 30. Dr. Hans saw this difference as not statistically different. Id.
132
Id. This appears to be a more appropriate sample with which to compare judges, who have
college and law degrees.
133
Id.
134
Id.
125
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this deficiency, splitting on the issue of whether they have the background
to make decisions on Daubert issues.135
Background need not condemn judges to inadequate performance,
however, so it is also important to review judicial scores on their current
ability to handle science. In the Gatowski study, judges responded to
questions on basic scientific study principles, regarding falsifiability, error
rate, peer review, and general acceptance.136 Judges answered that these
factors, enumerated in the Daubert opinion for the review of scientific
reliability,137 were useful in evaluating science under Daubert.138 In
defining some of these admittedly important principles, the judges scored
poorly. On the issue of error rate, the study indicated that only four
percent of the sample judges could correctly demonstrate “true
understanding” of the concept.139 On the issue of falsifiability, the study
indicated that only six percent of judges could demonstrate a “true
understanding” of the principle.140 While scores for peer review and
general acceptance were higher,141 Gatowski’s study shows a judiciary
struggling with basic scientific concepts.
Hans also studied judicial performance on application of scientific
principles, by testing judicial and juror responses to a questionnaire
regarding DNA evidence after a videotaped mock trial on the issue.142 Out
of eleven questions regarding the DNA evidence, judges fared better than
the total jury pool on three questions.143 When compared to the collegeeducated juror group, the judges scored lower than the jurors on three of
the eleven questions, and exceeded the college-educated jurors on one
question.144 Again considering that judges all will be college-educated,145
this performance is underwhelming.
In the epidemiologic risk controversy, basic definitional errors about
the application of relative risk resulted in judges evaluating epidemiologic
evidence outside its usual application.146 It is important to note that we
need not assume that judges have little experience with epidemiology from
135

Gatowski et al., supra note 123, at 442.
Id. at 444–48.
137
Daubert, 509 U.S. 579, 593–94 (1993).
138
Gatowski et al., supra note 123, at 444–47 (noting favorable responses of falsifiability (88%),
error rate (91%), peer review (92%), and general acceptance (93%)).
139
Id. at 447.
140
Id. at 444.
141
See id. at 447–48 (noting results of 71% peer review and 82% general acceptance).
142
Hans, supra note 123, at 29.
143
Id. at 36.
144
Id. at 37–38.
145
See supra note 132 and accompanying text (noting that in the Hans study, “judges showed a
significant deficit in math and science training”).
146
See supra text accompanying notes 48–50 (discussing the difficulty of using a population-wide
study to assess the risks of an individual).
136
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the case law alone; rather, the Gatowski study indicated that a large
majority of judges had “no experience at all” with epidemiology.147 Use of
epidemiology to extrapolate causation to a specific plaintiff requires the
legal use of epidemiologic definitions beyond the scope of what
researchers would do in the lab.148 Lack of familiarity with the
complexities of the scientific field, based on background demographics or
understanding of concepts, appears to play a role in these errors.
When this data is reviewed in relation to the epidemiologic risk
controversy,149 one must wonder if the judges are truly “up to the task” as
Daubert assumed.150 Reform efforts should address judges’ deficit in
training and application of scientific principles, seeking a solution to the
weaknesses exposed by the empirical research of Gatowski and Hans.151
B. Judicial Difficulty with the Use of Statistics
General scientific principles are not the sole area where judges score
poorly in empirical studies.152 The judicial handling of complex statistical
data is a distinct and critically important part of the Daubert system,
mandating review for judicial competence.
In an important study on the issue of judicial handling of statistical
information, Dr. Gary Wells studied the handling of statistics by judges as
compared to mock jurors (psychology students).153 By presenting the
jurors and judges with varying statistical information on a potential
liability issue in a mock case, and then comparing the data with results
from a similar probability issue without the statistical involvement, Wells
concluded that judges and the mock jurors were equally poor in analysis of
147
Gatowski et al., supra note 123, at 442 (noting that seventy-three percent of judges have no
experience at all with epidemiology).
148
See, e.g., Daubert II, 43 F.3d 1311, 1321–22 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting experts were unable to
provide sufficient evidence to prove causation); Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387,
1403–04 (D. Or. 1996) (discussing Daubert II and applying its evidentiary standards to the case); see
also supra text accompanying notes 19–23, 26–28 (discussing Daubert II and its holding that the
standard of proof is met when a substance’s relative risk to cause an injury is above 2.0).
149
See discussion supra Parts II.B.–E. (discussing epidemiological risk overview in relation to
judges’ evaluation of such evidence).
150
For discussion on whether the lack of knowledge results in poor admissibility decisions under
Daubert, see Joseph Sanders, The Merits of the Paternalistic Justification for Restrictions on the
Admissibility of Expert Evidence, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 881, 926–28 (2003) (analyzing Margaret
Bull Kovera & Bradley D. McAuliff, The Effects of Peer Review and Evidence Quality on Judge
Evaluations of Psychological Science: Are Judges Effective Gatekeepers?, 85 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL.
574, 575 (2000)).
151
See discussion infra Part IV (discussing reform efforts to help judges make informed
decisions).
152
See discussion supra Part III.A. (discussing the areas in which judges lack certain training that
would assist in their evaluation of scientific claims).
153
Gary L. Wells, Naked Statistical Evidence of Liability: Is Subjective Probability Enough?, 62
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 739, 739 (1992).
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statistical evidence. Of interest for Daubert purposes, the judges showed
wide variance on their determinations of liability for the mock case when
the judges reviewed statistical data, as compared to when the judges
reviewed equally probable non-statistical information.155 Wells noted that
there was “no theoretical reason in the current psychological literature to
expect that these versions of the evidence, which yield functionally
equivalent subjective probabilities, would produce highly discrepant
verdicts.”156 As a result, the judicial handling of statistical evidence may
not be a strength of the Daubert approach.
Other studies support the Wells results. A National Research Council
collection of six case studies regarding statistical assessment in a variety of
case settings supports the conclusion that judges fare poorly with statistical
analysis.157 The editor of the National Research Council collection, in a
different study, declared that “the complexity of statistical issues raised in
some cases will clearly put a resolution of conflicting expert testimony
beyond the ken of even the most thoughtful and well-trained jurist.”158
Examination of statistical evidence in Title VII litigation led Richard
Lempert to the same conclusion: “[S]tatistically untrained judges are
poorly equipped to make distinctions regarding statistical precedent.”159
Legal commentators note that this weakness affects the Daubert
assumption of judicial competence to handle complex cutting-edge science
involving statistics.160 In sum, the “reception of statistical evidence in the
courtroom has been cautious at best and uninformed at worst; the nonuse
and misuse of statistics have been more common than its use.”161
Judges’ poor performance with statistical evidence casts doubt on their
154
See id. at 748 (noting that both judges and psychology students made similar decisions based
on statistics, but that statistics were often ignored when using the preponderance of evidence standard).
155
Id. at 739, 743 (noting that students and trial judges averaged fewer than ten percent
affirmative decisions of liability based on statistical evidence alone, while the subjects averaged sixtyfive percent affirmative decisions of liability using other forms of evidence).
156
Id. at 750.
157
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, EVOLVING ROLE OF STATISTICAL ASSESSMENTS AS EVIDENCE IN
THE COURTS 72 (S.E. Fienberg ed., 1989).
158
Stephen E. Fienberg, The Increasing Sophistication of Statistical Assessments as Evidence in
Discrimination Litigation, 77 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 784, 786–87 (1982).
159
Richard Lempert, Befuddled Judges: Statistical Evidence in Title VII Cases, in LEGACIES OF
THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 263, 278 (Bernard Grofman ed., 2000).
160
See Cranor et al., supra note 25, at 6 (“[J]udges and lawyers may need to experience a
quantum leap in the subtleties of scientific inquiry in order to prevent various simplified views of
scientific evidence from undermining and subverting the goals of tort law.”); Gatowski et al., supra
note 123, at 454 (“[T]he survey findings raise concerns, however, about how well judges can exercise
their discretion if they lack the requisite understanding of science and its methods.”); Vidmar &
Diamond, supra note 102, at 1170–73 (discussing recent studies that investigate whether judges are
superior to juries in interpreting statistical evidence).
161
DAVID W. BARNES & JOHN M. CONLEY, STATISTICAL EVIDENCE IN LITIGATION 3–4 (1986);
see Breyer, supra note 121, at 4.
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ability to evaluate epidemiology under Daubert. Initially, it is important to
note again that the Gatowski study showed a substantial majority of judges
had no experience with epidemiologic evidence,162 and therefore its
statistical underpinnings. Since epidemiologists “speak in the statistical
language of risks and probabilities,”163 the role of statistical literacy in
Daubert determinations regarding epidemiology cannot be understated.
Evaluation of the judicial handling of statistical information in the
epidemiologic risk controversy cases demonstrates the judicial difficulty in
analyzing and weighing statistical information. Statistical weakness leads
to two scientifically false propositions from the epidemiology case law:
probability of causation being computed solely from relative risk, and the
bright-line determination of an exposure dose that results in a probability
of causation exceeding fifty percent, equaling the “doubling dose” for all
individuals.164 Essentially, the courts have adopted a statistical test that
scientists devalue as representing what the courts believe it represents.165
When the use/misuse of statistics is evaluated in the epidemiologic risk
controversy, one must again wonder if judges are “up to the task,” as
Daubert suggested. Reform efforts must also address judges’ lack of
statistical background and misuse of statistical principles, seeking a
solution to the weaknesses exposed by the studies done by Wells, the
National Research Council, and others, as well as the epidemiologic case
law.166
C. Bright-Line Tests May Not be Scientifically Sound
The Daubert framework allows for the ultimate bright-line test:
admissibility. Of course it is proper that judges should make these choices.
But in the creation of bright-line rules about science, and then using those
rules—scientifically sound, and otherwise—to make evidence
admissibility determinations, judges risk enshrining poor science into law.
The epidemiologic relative risk controversy is a textbook example of
bright-line rule valuation trumping scientific principles.
A bright-line rule is, by definition, a rule of decision that resolves
ambiguities at the potential expense of equity.167 Bright-line rules can
162
Gatowski et al., supra note 123, at 442 (reporting that seventy-three percent of judges indicate
no experience at all with epidemiology).
163
In re Joint E. & S. Asbestos Litig., 52 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1995).
164
Greenland, Methodologic Error, supra note 44, at 1166. For examples of the use of these
doubling dose/relative risk numbers in cases for the “more likely than not” standard, see discussion
supra Part II.B. Regarding courts rejecting this approach as unsound, see infra text accompanying
notes 167–84. See also Carruth & Goldstein, supra note 45, at 209 (criticizing the use of the
doubling/dose relative risk standard).
165
Thompson, supra note 93, at 264–65.
166
See discussion infra Part IV (discussing appropriate suggestions for successful reform).
167
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 205 (8th ed. 2004).
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work well in the judicial system, providing ease of application, notice, and
clear standards. As a result, bright-line tests appeal to courts in a diverse
range of legal disputes, from First Amendment case law,168 to Fourth
Amendment search and seizure cases,169 to antitrust litigation.170 The
Black’s Law Dictionary definition recognizes that the clarity of the rule is
achieved at the potential cost of equity.
In the epidemiologic risk controversy, courts enshrined bright-line tests
for relative risks in order to prove causation.171 In doing so, courts
sacrificed scientific validity at the altar of certainty. Part of the problem is
the competing cultures of the fields of law and science.172 Uncertainty
remains an integral part of scientific analysis.173 After all research is
completed, data taken, and analysis performed, scientists recognize the
place for uncertainty.174 Epidemiology is a field that contains a large
degree of subjective analysis, involving uncertainty and the analysis
thereof.175
In overemphasizing the bright-line tests, courts gloss over the
uncertainty inherent in the epidemiologic analysis with a veneer of
objectivity.176 In doing so, the courts deviate from the practice of
scientists,177 who must perform their research with additional complicating
subjective factors.178 Finally, the bright-line rule negatively affects the
168
See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (creating a bright-line rule
that “prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his
official conduct unless he proves the statement was made with ‘actual malice’” in certain
circumstances); Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk, and the First Amendment: Unraveling the “Chilling
Effect,” 58 B.U. L. REV. 685, 716–17 (1978) (discussing, in part, the bright-line test used to determine
what speech constitutes obscenity).
169
See, e.g., Leslie A. Lunney, The (Inevitably Arbitrary) Placement of Bright Lines: Belton and
Its Progeny, 79 TUL. L. REV. 365, 375–76 (2004) (discussing, for example, the bright-line rule
articulated by the United States Supreme Court with regard to the permissible scope of a search and
seizure without a warrant).
170
See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Christopher R. Leslie, Categorical Analysis in Antitrust
Jurisprudence, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1207, 1211, 1259 (2008) (noting that antitrust law is “rife with
categorical distinctions,” that bright-line rules have developed in the courts and are not necessarily
related to antitrust statutes, and that bright-line rules are valuable in that they allow for business
strategy planning).
171
See discussion supra Part II.B. (discussing Daubert II and the development of the rule
regarding relative risk).
172
See Greenland, Critical Appraisal, supra note 2, at 293–94 (discussing conflict between sound
scientific principles and the adjudication process).
173
Id.
174
Id.
175
Beyea & Berger, supra note 1, at 356–57; Finley, supra note 35, at 365.
176
Finley, supra note 35, at 365; see also Cranor et al., supra note 25, at 58 (noting that statistical
associational probabilities are only one form of relevant evidence important to decision-making).
177
See Finley, supra note 35, at 359–62 (discussing courts’ implicit and explicit deviation from
strict adherence to scientific principles when considering epidemiological evidence).
178
See supra notes 92–95 and accompanying text (discussing epidemiologists’ role in the
adjudication process).
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perception of other, less seemingly objective, scientific principles.
Some courts clearly recognized the problem with making certainty out
of scientific judgment and doubt.180 The Ninth Circuit explicitly rejected
the need for a bright-line approach in In re Hanford: “[T]he validity of a
claim should not depend on whether a plaintiff was exposed to a fraction of
a rem lower than the ‘doubling dose.’”181 In doing so, the panel recognized
a flaw in the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Daubert II.182 The
rejection of the bright-line approach produced a different result in In re
Hanford, but the Daubert II precedent had been relied upon for seven years
to that point, and it continues to influence decisions today.183
Bright-line tests play an important role in the legal system, and clearly
can have beneficial effects. The epidemiologic risk controversy shows the
valuation of bright-line tests can come with unexpected or undesirable
consequences, and may lack scientific validity. Reform efforts must note
the tendency of the law to seek objectivity, even when it may not be
present or used by the field, in the evaluation of scientific evidence under
Daubert.184
D. Outlier Enhancement Concerns
Yet another consideration for evaluation of complex science under the
Daubert standard is the issue of “outlier enhancement”; that is, when the
scientific evidence presented gives the court a false or incomplete picture
of the state of the overall scientific knowledge in the field. Both run-ofthe-mill and highly complex scientific issues can potentially suffer from
this difficulty, although the more complex the science, the less likely the
judge will be to be able to spot and compensate for the potential of skewed
science.185
179
See Cranor et al., supra note 25, at 58 (noting that courts’ use of stringent rules in deciding the
admissibility of evidence “may lead to consideration of a narrower range of evidence” than scientists
would normally consider).
180
See discussion supra Part II.D. (noting courts that have rejected the Daubert II bright-line
rule).
181
In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 292 F.3d 1124, 1137 (9th Cir. 2002).
182
See id. By holding that the validity of a claim should not depend on a bright-line rule, the
panel effectively disagreed with the Daubert II court’s use of the “doubling dose” standard. See id.
183
See, e.g., Henricksen v. ConocoPhillips Co., 605 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1153 (E.D. Wash. 2009)
(citing Daubert II as controlling precedent).
184
See discussion infra Part IV (detailing reform efforts that will, in part, consider the tendency of
the law to seek objectivity by ensuring courts take science into account prior to making decisions).
185
Both the judge and the jury will usually, as untrained non-experts, have difficulty evaluating
the weaknesses and overall state of science in the field. Bernstein, supra note 3, at 486; see also
Jennifer L. Mnookin, Expert Evidence, Partisanship, and Epistemic Competence, 73 BROOK. L. REV.
1009, 1030–31 (2008) (discussing use of expert judges and juries as solution to the problem); Joseph
Sanders, From Science to Evidence: The Testimony on Causation in the Bendectin Cases, 46 STAN. L.
REV. 1, 37–39 (1993) (noting that even with the use of expert witnesses, juries will have difficulty
ascertaining whether the expert’s opinion is, in fact, accurate).
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Selection bias can occur through a litigant’s selection of an expert
mainly in order to represent a perspective on science that a litigant
proposes for his/her case.186 The bias is based in the narrow interest of the
party to maximize the persuasive effect of the presentation to the jury in
the promotion of the case.187
In a more general sense, the problem of outlier enhancement is a
byproduct of the basic antithesis between the legal and scientific methods.
Scientific inquiry is rooted in the testing of opinions through the collection
of data, debate among alternatives, recognition of the limitations or areas
of uncertainty in the field, and the assumptions necessary to make a
conclusion.188 Legal process involves the partisan presentation of materials
to a necessarily generalist jury pool.189 The method of decision making has
a great effect on the selection of experts.
Experts in the fields of science should remain open-minded, recognize
the limitations of their research, and should be open to the consideration of
new theories or hypotheses.190 In contrast, expert witnesses get selected
for their positions in the field, loyalty for the client, and advocacy.191
Two byproducts of expert witness bias in the legal system are
immediately apparent: that experts selected by a party in a legal case may
represent opinions that are accepted by only a small minority of persons in
their field,192 and that opposing experts must be neutralized by attack
whether or not their position is more or less valid than the opposing
viewpoint.193
186
See Bernstein, supra note 3, at 456 (discussing selection bias with those providing expert
testimony).
187
See Mnookin, supra note 185, at 1011 (noting that the typical expert witness is one who might
not be the most knowledgeable expert, but is often the one who is most persuasive to the jury).
188
See Greenland, Critical Appraisal, supra note 2, at 293 (arguing that scientific inferences are
“derived from assumptions as well as from data”).
189
See id. at 294 (noting that expert witnesses are chosen in order argue one party’s position).
The more professional experience the witness may have, the less likely the jury may be able to make
determinations on the issues contained within the testimony rather than the expert himself or herself.
See Sanders, supra note 185, at 37 (“Persuasiveness is not always a useful indicator of truth.”).
190
See Greenland, Critical Appraisal, supra note 2, at 293–94 (discussing basic goals of scientific
reporting).
191
See id. at 294 (discussing the need for lawyers to advocate for their clients); Vidmar &
Diamond, supra note 102, at 1133 (noting that experts are often selected based on their loyalty to a
particular party). For a detailed examination of the issue of selection bias in the context of complex
toxic torts, see Sanders, supra note 185, at 26 n.130. See also Bernstein, supra note 3, at 456
(discussing selection bias in the context of choosing expert witnesses).
192
See Vidmar & Diamond, supra note 102, at 1133 (discussing the fact that some experts’
opinions do not represent the majority position on particular issues); see also Bernstein, supra note 3, at
456–57 (discussing a jury’s perspective when hearing multiple experts’ testimony); Greenland, Critical
Appraisal, supra note 2, at 305 (noting that scientists represent their own viewpoints as standard within
the field).
193
See Vidmar & Diamond, supra note 102, at 1133–34 (noting that the adversary system pits one
expert against the other); see also Bernstein, supra note 3, at 456–57 (arguing that when the consensus
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When the Daubert regime replaced the Frye system, the consideration
of “general acceptance” of the scientific information changed from the
central analysis on the admissibility of the testimony, to one of many
considerations in a multi-factorial test for reliability.194 After Daubert,
judges applying the multi-factorial Daubert reliability test must also
consider error rate, peer review, methodology, existence of standards and
controls, and overall methodology, in addition to or instead of analyzing
general acceptance.195 Added to the problem is that judges, untrained in
science themselves,196 are more likely to see “science” as a logical,
coherent, and largely irrefutable process seeking truth from the natural
world.197 Under these circumstances and with this viewpoint, scientists
outside the mainstream are more likely, if not nearly universal, in the
analyses of scientific disputes in the court; these “outliers” have stormed
the courtroom with nonstandard or unusual science, as part of the
adversarial system.
The epidemiologic risk controversy is an example of the “outlier
enhancement” of scientists in the courtroom.
The acceptance of
epidemiologic relative risk as the sine qua non of causation in toxic torts is
an example of the science within the courtroom clearly diverting away
from the mainstream practice of science.198 As one epidemiologist notes,
the doubling-of-the-risk analysis of the Ninth Circuit in Daubert II “is not
the most reasonable inference [for the court] to make.”199 Rather, the
court’s determinations were suspect, and it “seems clear that a substantially
different conclusion would have been reached on some of these scientific
issues in the regulatory context.”200 There lies the problem: judges making
decisions on complex science, outside of their expertise, guided by experts
selected based on their loyalty to the party and advocacy for the cause.201
As a result, judges make decisions memorializing questionable scientific
lies closer to one expert’s view, a jury gets a false sense that the litigated issue is a close one);
Greenland, Critical Appraisal, supra note 2, at 294 (noting that lawyers are working in an adversary
system and need to protect their client’s interests); Sanders, supra note 185, at 47 (“[C]rossexamination becomes a ritual that does not little to clarify the strengths and weaknesses of a witness’
testimony.”).
194
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593–94 (1993); see also supra text
accompanying notes 13–15.
195
See supra text accompanying notes 13–15 (discussing the new Daubert requirements).
196
See discussion supra Parts III.A.–B.
197
See Beyea & Berger, supra note 1, at 330–31 (noting that judges are likely to require scientists
“to make generalizations from observations or data to general laws of nature”).
198
See discussion supra Part II.B. and supra notes 92–95 and accompanying text (discussing
epidemiology and noting that evaluation of science in the courtroom can be difficult, uncomfortable, or
daunting).
199
Beyea & Berger, supra note 1, at 354.
200
Rodricks & Rieth, supra note 50, at 29.
201
See supra note 185 and accompanying text (noting that judges tend to have more difficulty
identifying skewed science when the scientific complexity of an issue increases).
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reasoning into decisions.
Expert witnesses play an important role in the legal system, and clearly
are necessary to assist the jury/judge in evaluating scientific or technical
issues. The epidemiologic risk controversy shows that reliance on experts,
largely selected for their loyalty and advocacy to a party in an adversarial
system, can result in non-representative science being presented within the
courtroom that would not succeed in the scientific field. Reform efforts
must take into account this procedural and systematic concern when
seeking appropriate amendments to the system of evaluation of scientific
evidence under Daubert.202
E. Constraints of Legal Procedure
In addition to the concerns about judicial scientific and statistical
backgrounds, bright-line rules, and outlier enhancement, concerns about
the legal system structure also deserve mention for consideration in reform
efforts. Two examples—the role of cross-examination in expert evaluation
and discovery timelines under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—will
provide some insight into the procedural problems affecting the quality of
complex science in the courtroom.
1. Cross-Examination
Cross-examination is considered the “greatest legal engine ever created
for the discovery of truth.”203 It is the central right of the Sixth
Amendment’s Confrontation Clause,204 and is so central to the
determination of truth in many civil cases as to be required by due
process.205 Clearly cross-examination will and must remain a facet of trial
practice.
This is not to say, however, that in the context of complex or cuttingedge science that cross-examination is foolproof or flawless. Crossexamination can feed upon the jury’s preconceived notions of the truth and
fact. As an example, in one study performed in a simulated rape trial, an
attorney introduced through cross-examination a negative fact about the

202
See discussion infra Part IV (discussing various ways to improve courts’ ability to process
complex scientific evidence).
203
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (quoting 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1367 (3d
ed. 1940)).
204
See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 60–61 (2004) (discussing the Sixth Amendment
and how courts seek reliable evidence in part through cross-examination).
205
See, e.g., Van Harken v. City of Chicago, 103 F.3d 1346, 1352 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting that in
civil cases, “live testimony and cross-examination might be so important as to be required by due
process,” although noting judicial equivocation on the issue).
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206

expert.
Even when denied and uncorroborated, the innuendo of the
cross-examination question negatively affected the credibility of the
expert.207 The study’s authors concluded that “the use of presumptuous
questions is a dirty trick that can be used to distort jurors’ evaluations of a
witness’ credibility. As cross-examiners regularly employ such tactics,
judges should be aware of the dangers and make a serious effort to control
them.”208 Note that in this study, the researchers used a presumed fact
based in common-sense regarding the outside perception of the experts’
research.
In a case involving complex or cutting-edge scientific thought,
improper cross-examination questions have an even greater chance to
influence the jury.209 When expert testimony has been approved, jurors are
necessarily unknowledgeable about the subject matter involved.210 So
should the cross-examining attorney introduce a fact regarding the subject
of the science rather than a common-sense perception about the expert, the
jury is necessarily unable to make an objective determination about that
fact.211 When lacking the necessary signposts to evaluate material, the
jurors can unintentionally oversimplify the material and rely
overwhelmingly on peripheral cues.212 The more difficult the material, the
more likely the jury will have to rely on non-central peripheral cues, rather
than an understanding of the details of the testimony.213 In many complex
cases, cross-examination will feed to these jury biases by focusing on
tangential areas of credibility, from accepting fees for expert review to the
Crossperception of inconsistency with deposition testimony.214
examination in this context becomes a ritual: less about the strengths and
weaknesses of the expert opinions and more about jury bias and peripheral
matters.215 Research has shown that juror comprehension in complex
206
See Saul M. Kassin et al., Dirty Tricks of Cross-Examination: The Influence of Conjectural
Evidence on the Jury, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 373, 376 (1990) (noting that the negative fact regards
whether the expert’s data has been “sharply criticized”).
207
Id. at 378.
208
Id. at 382 (internal citations omitted).
209
For an evaluation of various studies in complex and other fields, see Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovic &
Valerie P. Hans, Jurors’ Evaluations of Expert Testimony: Judging the Messenger and the Message, 28
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 441, 447–49 (2003).
210
FED. R. EVID. 702. See Mnookin, supra note 185, at 1012 (noting that expert witnesses are
necessary because the jury would otherwise not be knowledgeable about the subject at hand).
211
See Mnookin, supra note 185, at 1012–14 (discussing evaluation of competence of an expert
witness).
212
See Vidmar & Diamond, supra note 102, at 1138–39 (noting that juries often take “mental
short cuts” when evaluating expert testimony).
213
See id. at 1139 (stating that jurors often rely on peripheral clues); Mnookin, supra note 185, at
1013 (noting that jurors often have to rely on “proxy criteria” in assessing expert testimony).
214
See Sanders, supra note 185, at 47–48 (discussing tendency of opposing counsel to attempt to
discredit an expert witness by highlighting irrelevant facts such as expert fees).
215
See id. (noting that cross-examination can become ritualistic).
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216

epidemiologic cases is less than ideal.
In evaluating jurors’ knowledge
about epidemiologic risk after complex trials, several researchers have
concluded that jurors misunderstood the epidemiologic evidence presented
to them at trials.217 As a result, at least one study determined that in an
epidemiologic case, jurors tended to focus on the individual expert’s
personality and behavior rather than the substance of the testimony.218 The
cross-examination tactics in complex cases involving epidemiology—
including focusing on tangential issues of credibility or demanding an
unscientific level of accuracy in any statements—result in the process
diminishing as a useful tool for the judge or jury to determine facts.219
Studies showing juror susceptibility to lawyers injecting misleading
bias information, in addition to the research regarding the complexity and
uncertainty posed by epidemiologic evidence, demonstrate that jurors’
capacity to be misled in complex cases cannot be seriously doubted. As a
result, reform including the addition of some level of objectivity, or at most
signposts of credibility, might allow jurors to focus more on the substance
of testimony in the most complex cases.220
2. Discovery Deadlines
One final consideration regarding the Daubert regime meriting
mention is the discovery timeline in federal civil litigation. The civil
discovery process involves formalized disclosure of relevant evidence of
each party well before trial. While meeting the requirements of due
process, the discovery process may negatively affect the scientific merit of
the witnesses as compared to the practice of science outside the courtroom.
This is particularly true with epidemiologic evidence.
Discovery timelines are set according to a formalized schedule. Under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16, a court will hold a pretrial conference
and set a discovery schedule including expert witness disclosures.221
While there is no set time at which the expert disclosure must occur except
that which is set by the pretrial order, pretrial orders often involve
216
See supra text accompanying notes 143–44 (discussing studies evaluating juries’
comprehension of complex statistical information).
217
See MOLLY SELVIN & LARRY PICUS, THE RAND CORPORATION, THE DEBATE OVER JURY
PERFORMANCE 24 (1987); Joseph Sanders, The Jury Deliberation in a Complex Case: Havner v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 16 JUST. SYS. J. 45, 52 (1993) (noting that complex cases involving
plaintiffs’ injuries following mass-exposure to certain substances are often difficult for juries to
decide). Both studies are discussed, along with complex non-epidemiologic case studies, in Vidmar &
Diamond, supra note 102, at 1146–49.
218
SELVIN & PICUS, supra note 217, at viii–ix.
219
Sanders, supra note 185, at 50–51 (discussing how battling experts tend to diminish benefits of
cross-examination).
220
See discussion infra Part IV (noting reform efforts should work toward bringing “science back
into the courthouse”).
221
FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(2).
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disclosure deadlines early in the case, so that the case may be in an
advanced procedural posture earlier than otherwise.222 Once set, the
pretrial order cannot be modified except on a finding of good cause.223
Through this process, the litigants will discover their opponents’ expert
witnesses’ identities, the substance of their testimony, and some indication
of the trial strategy from the expert reports.
While fair for due process, this procedure is in opposition to the
general tenets of the scientific method. Scientists in general are trained to
utilize new data, reinterpret studies, and take new information into account
when formulating and testing hypotheses.224 As a result, a researcher must
be willing to review and analyze new information for the effect it may
have on the overall theory.
Epidemiology is a science particularly invested in re-evaluation of new
information. Because of the use of epidemiology largely in the regulatory
public health sphere,225 a premium exists for the early dissemination of
information regarding public health risks.226 The risks are then taken into
account and evaluated as continued study progresses.227 Through this
process, the public health is protected from an exposure where the initial
data indicates a threat to human health. However, the system works poorly
outside the regulatory sphere, in the context of tort litigation. In the tort
legal system, the need to disclose particular information at an early stage in
the proceedings can prevent or limit any additional analysis, or re-analysis,
of information due to the discovery deadlines, resulting in a limited amount
of data regarding the issue being contested.228
Because the Daubert standard asks courts to hold scientists to the same
standard in the courtroom as used in the laboratory,229 it seems odd to think
that courts mandate, through discovery procedures, a timeline that excludes
a valid and appropriate method of scientific inquiry. While not appropriate
in every case, some consideration of the effect that a rigid discovery
timeline has on scientific evidence in the courtroom would also be an

222
Some states have specific deadlines set into rule. See, e.g., COLO. R. CIV. P. 16 (providing
rules regarding trial management).
223
FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(4).
224
See, e.g., Greenland, Critical Appraisal, supra note 2, at 293 (noting that a scientist should
review all available data and may recognize a need for additional study prior to forming a conclusion).
225
See Rodricks & Rieth, supra note 50, at 31 (discussing the epidemiological studies in light of
the regulatory scheme).
226
Carruth & Goldstein, supra note 45, at 207.
227
Id.
228
Id.; see Cranor et al., supra note 25, at 61 (noting that judges should consider whether
admission of certain types of evidence will further the legal purposes of tort law).
229
Kuhmo Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999); Rosen v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 78 F.3d
316, 318 (7th Cir. 1996).

84

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:49

230

appropriate consideration for reform efforts.

IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM TO ADDRESS THE IDENTIFIED
WEAKNESSES
The epidemiologic risk controversy exposed Daubert as a system with
multiple problems with judicial evaluation of cutting-edge complex
science, including basic judicial knowledge of scientific principles, the
judicial handling of statistical evidence, use of bright-line tests that may
not be scientifically sound, outlier enhancement, and the constraints of the
legal process on science.
Having reviewed and analyzed the nature of each difficulty, this
section will now address potential solutions to those exposed weaknesses.
In doing so, the goal is to forge a better compromise between science and
the courtroom, in order to increase the efficiency, accuracy, and
consistency of judicial gatekeeping decisions under Daubert.
A. Use of Rule 706 Experts as Judicial Science Consultants
The first area ripe for modification is the current structure of the Court
Appointed Expert Rule, to allow for appointment of a science consultant to
assist the judge with gatekeeping under Daubert. The current rules create
practical restraints on the appointment of an independent expert, so
modification of the current system would encourage science consultants to
be appointed in appropriate cases.231 As a result, the use of independent
experts can shift from the exception rather than the rule to an expectation
in most complex tort cases.
The current structure of the Federal Rules of Evidence results in
practical limitations on the appointment of a science consultant. Under
Federal Rule 706—the Court Appointed Expert Rule—the court may
appoint an independent expert on motion of the court or the parties.232 This
expert may be selected by the judge or by nominations of the parties, and
will be paid by the parties “in such proportion and at such time as the court
directs, and thereafter charged in like manner as other costs.”233 While the
expert serves the court, a Rule 706 expert under the current rule must
advise the parties of his/her opinions, can be deposed by either party, and
can be called to testify at trial.234
230
See discussion infra Part IV (offering a general discussion of reform efforts designed to
remedy problems resulting from expert witnesses’ presentations of epidemiological evidence in court).
231
The independent expert appointments should be limited to those cases that do not meet the
qualifications for advanced science procedures. See infra Parts IV.B.1.–2.
232
FED. R. EVID. 706(a).
233
FED. R. EVID. 706(b). See, e.g., Leesona Corp. v. Varta Batteries, Inc., 522 F. Supp. 1304,
1312 n.21 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (discussing Rule 706(b)).
234
FED. R. EVID. 706(a).
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Independent of the Court Appointed Expert Rule 706 powers, the court
also has an inherent power to appoint experts to assist in the determination
of preliminary issues of fact under Federal Rule of Evidence 104. Under
Rule 104, the judge must make initial determinations of whether evidence
should be admissible for consideration by the jury, as an exercise of a
parallel and more general power like Daubert gatekeeping under Rule
702.235 Courts have used this power to appoint experts to evaluate
complex science, avoiding the necessity of availability for trial testimony
or deposition.236 In the Hall litigation regarding silicone gel breast
implants and disease, the judge explicitly mentioned Rule 104 as an
alternative to Rule 706, to “keep the advisors independent of any ongoing
proceedings” and because Rule 706 requires the appointed experts “in
effect, to act as additional witnesses subject to deposition and trial.”237
Judges support the power to appoint experts, while remaining
sometimes reluctant to actually do so, based on survey results in empirical
research.238 In one important study, surveys were sent to 537 federal
judges.239 These judges indicated overwhelmingly (87%) that court
appointed experts are likely to be helpful in certain cases.240 A separate
study also demonstrated that a high percentage of federal (76%) and state
(70%) court judges approved of court appointed expert appointment.241
However, independent experts do not appear to be appointed very
often. In the Cecil and Willging federal judicial poll, only twenty percent
of judges had appointed an independent expert.242 While lack of cases
requiring an independent expert was one reason for failure to appoint,
judges surveyed indicated that their failure to use an expert related to
respect for and adherence to the adversarial system.243
As a response, and to encourage the use of court appointed
independent experts, the Court Appointed Expert Rule should be rewritten
to account for judicial reluctance to appoint independent scientific
235

FED. R. EVID. 104(a).
See, e.g., Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1392 n.8 (D. Or. 1996) (utilizing
Rule 104 rather than 706).
237
Id.
238
“Since passage in 1975, the rule has been little used, although authors often discuss its possible
use.” MORRIS H. DEGROOT ET AL., STATISTICS AND THE LAW 309 (1986).
239
See Joe S. Cecil & Thomas S. Willging, Accepting Daubert’s Invitation: Defining a Role for
Court-Appointed Experts in Assessing Scientific Validity, 43 EMORY L.J. 995, 1004 n.33 (1994) (noting
431 responses to a survey sent to 537 judges).
240
Id. at 1008–09.
241
Louis Harris & Associates, Inc., Judges’ Opinions on Procedural Issues: A Survey of State and
Federal Trial Judges Who Spend at Least Half Their Time on General Civil Cases, 69 B.U. L. REV.
731, 741 (1989).
242
Cecil & Willging, supra note 239, at 1004.
243
See id. at 1018–19 (noting that respect for the adversarial system is cited by judges as a
rationale for not allowing expert testimony).
236
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consultants. Additional language would be added to Rule 706, as Rule
706(e), allowing appointment of a court appointed science consultant,
under the same payment terms of Rule 706(a) experts, for the use of the
judge to evaluate and address specific scientific questions that arise from
the dispute.244 With this change, the court would have an expert to assist
the judge in addressing complicated scientific material under Daubert, with
the proper background to do so, but without throwing a third expert into
the presentation aspects of trial.
The ability of a court to appoint a scientific consultant has several
beneficial effects on complex litigation. First, the appointment of a nondeposable expert would reduce the main hindrance to judges in appointing
scientific experts to assist them. Second, it would allow a knowledgeable
specialist to provide much-needed insight into scientific issues arising in
complex litigation, overcoming the judicial scientific-and-statisticalbackground weaknesses exposed by empirical studies.245 Third, the
litigants’ experts, who may be chosen as a result of “outlier
enhancement,”246 may recognize that their scientific opinions will be
subject to third party review by the judge’s science consultant, and produce
opinions with a more neutral, less partisan opinion.247 Fourth, the use of
independent experts will offer reluctant but skilled scientists a chance to
participate in legal cases involving their field.248 Finally, the use of
scientific consultants will bring back to the courtroom a lost, or perhaps
misplaced, part of scientific inquiry: the general state of knowledge in the
field.249 By evaluating the general state of knowledge in the field, the court
can understand and place the opinions of the litigants’ experts into
perspective on the range of scientific opinion in the area.250
Certain weaknesses of this proposal merit response. Some critics
244
See Robert L. Hess II, Note, Judges Cooperating With Scientists: A Proposal for More
Effective Limits on the Federal Trial Judge’s Inherent Power to Appoint Technical Advisors, 54 VAND.
L. REV. 547, 587 (2001) (suggesting a new Rule 707 to allow for separate technical advisors to serve as
judicial experts).
245
See discussion supra Parts III.A.–B. (discussing judges’ difficulty in understanding evidence
presented in particularly complex litigation).
246
See discussion supra Part III.D. (discussing outlier enhancement in the context of evaluation of
complex science).
247
See Confronting the New Challenges of Scientific Evidence, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1481, 1590–
91 (1995) (noting the general effect of reducing partisanship through independent consultant
appointment).
248
Hess, supra note 244, at 562–63. Regarding the benefits of the one-time expert, see Jurs,
supra note 101, at 80–81.
249
Sanders, supra note 185, at 67. Under Frye, the general acceptance test was the sole inquiry of
scientific admissibility. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Under Daubert,
general acceptance became one of many considerations to evaluate in the reliability consideration, but
is without question not necessary for admissibility. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S.
579, 593–94 (1993).
250
Bernstein, supra note 3, at 475.
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allege that the potential bias of experts may be re-created with the
appointment of a singular expert.251 In response, the science consultant
would be available in some cases, but on the most technical and complex
cases a panel of experts or a science court approach may be used, as
discussed in the next section.252 In addition, the judge will ultimately
maintain control of the situation, and should he be trained and sensitive to
the issue,253 be able to narrow the inquiry so that the expert makes only
scientific determinations rather than legal ones. Finally, any judicial
analysis of the science under Daubert will ultimately result in a judicial
opinion, so the judge’s analysis of the issue will be available for review
and, if necessary, appeal. Collectively, these mechanisms should assure
fairness to the parties.
Other critics might suggest that since the ability of the parties to
depose the expert has been removed, asking the litigants to pay the costs of
expert appointment may no longer be permissible.254 Initially, one should
note that Rules of Evidence are approved by an Act of Congress, so that
the statutory basis would be clear. If the court then requires the litigants to
pay the costs, such costs are not a “taking” as the litigants should recognize
the court’s need to properly and correctly evaluate complex science under
Daubert. As such, the costs are no different than other litigation costs, like
stenography or copies, and do not fit within the narrow confines of judicial
“takings” law.255 There appears to be no reason why these expert costs
251
This concern is mentioned in Beyea & Berger, supra note 1, at 364 (citing Ellen E. Deason,
Court-Appointed Expert Witnesses: Scientific Positivism Meets Bias and Deference, 77 OR. L. REV. 59,
62 (1998)). See also Bernstein, supra note 3, at 477; Sanders, supra note 185, at 69.
252
See infra Part IV.B.; see also Sanders, supra note 185, at 69. Note also that these approaches
can be used in concert, as a judge could appoint a Rule 706 consultant to review appropriate scientific
materials, but also await the results of a directly related Complex Science Litigation Panel or Court of
Scientific Jurisdiction review before rendering a final decision. This approach is reminiscent of Judge
Jones in Hall, who issued a ruling following use of Rule 104 experts, but decided to defer the effective
date of the opinion until the Science Panel from the Multi District Breast Implant case rendered a
decision. Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1394 (D. Or. 1996) (citing In re Silicone
Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. CV 92-P-10000-S, 1996 WL 34401813, at *1–2 (N.D. Ala.
May 31, 1996)). The decision in Hall was issued in December 1996, while the Panel issued its report
on December 1, 1998. Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Scientific Authority: The Breast Implant
Litigation and Beyond, 86 VA. L. REV. 801, 810, 815 (2000); Hall, 947 F. Supp. at 1387; In re Silicone
Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. CV 92-P-10000-S, 1998 WL 35223618, at *1 (N.D. Ala.
Dec. 16, 1998).
253
See infra Part IV.C.2. Note that in cases that follow a scientific panel opinion, the court’s
analysis of the issue could be pared down to the essential elements unique to the new case before it.
See infra Part IV.B.1.
254
Under this proposal, costs would remain taxable to the parties, per Federal Rule of Evidence
706(b).
255
See Roderick E. Walston, The Constitution and Property: Due Process, Regulatory Takings,
and Judicial Takings, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 379, 431–38 (2001) (discussing takings law as applied to the
judiciary and whether the court should be “subject to the same takings restraints that apply to
legislative regulation”).
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could not be lawfully taxable to the parties.
Permitting appointment of independent scientific consultants would
overcome some of the weaknesses of the current Daubert regime. It would
allow scientific analysis back into the chambers of the courts, and provide
for the wise exercise of Rule 702 Daubert discretion.
B. The Most Complex Cases Receive Advanced Science Procedures
The benefit of singular, independent science consultants does have
limitations. For a subset of more complex cases, particularly those of first
impression, an enhanced review process may be in order. In such cases,
the courts should have advanced methods for evaluating cutting-edge or
complex science. I propose two distinct alternative methods for advanced
scientific analysis: creating case-level Complex Litigation Science Panels,
or establishing a new Court of Scientific Jurisdiction.
1. Complex Litigation Science Panels
The first alternative is to empower the courts to appoint a Complex
Litigation Science Panel (“CLSP”) in certain “complex science cases” to
thoroughly evaluate issues and create the best possible precedent for
evaluation of issues by subsequent judges. This Article therefore proposes
a new rule, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 74, to meet these goals.256
256

Proposed FED. R. CIV. P. 74:
Complex Litigation Science Panel
a. In cases designated under subsection (b), the District Court shall have the
authority to appoint a Complex Litigation Science Panel, empowered to
review the litigants’ expert disclosures and reports, if any, and issue a
Scientific Panel Advisory Report pursuant to subsection (e).
b. Cases Included: a Complex Litigation Science Panel shall be permissible
when the court finds any of the following:
1. Scientific or Technical Information is essential to assist the court in
the determination of admissibility of evidence under FED. R. EVID. 702;
2. The science or technical information presented in the case has a high
potential to be evaluated by other courts; or
3. A single science consultant may not provide the needed perspective
on all the issues presented by the litigants.
c. Selection of Panelists: a Complex Litigation Science Panel shall consist of
three members. The Plaintiff or group of Plaintiffs shall select a single
member, and the Defendants shall select a single member. In the event a
panelist cannot be selected, the court shall make a selection on behalf of that
party. Upon selection of each of the first two panelists, the panelists shall
meet and select a third member, to serve as chair of the Panel.
d. Duty of Panel Members: Panel members must affirm, by oath or
otherwise, that they will review the scientific material impartially and, to the
best of their abilities, within the normal constraints of their particular
scientific discipline.
e. Contents of Report: A Scientific Panel Advisory Report Shall include
Analysis of:
1. Areas of Consensus between the Litigants’ Expert or Experts;
2. Areas of Disagreement between the Litigants Expert or Experts;
a. Those areas which the Panel Members Agree on How to
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The threshold question in a case involving expert testimony is whether
it is a case that will qualify for a CLSP under the rule, rather than the
standard science consultant method from a modified Rule 706. The
proposed Rule 74 lists three separate considerations for appointment of a
CLSP: (1) a determination of essential need by the judge; (2) high potential
for evaluation in the future; or (3) the determination that a single scientific
consultant would not be appropriate.257 While these may allow for use of
the procedure in a wide variety of cases where the court finds a need, it is
important to remember that use of science panels is limited since this
procedure will take time and be expensive. As a practical reality, then, the
procedure may be limited to those cases that meet more than one of the
three requirements.
Next, the selection procedure for the science panel should be
indisputably fair, in order to enhance legitimacy of its views. In other
areas of dispute resolution, a tripartite panel of arbitrators may address
hotly contested issues and issue a final report.258 Each party to the dispute
is able to appoint one arbitrator to the panel, and the two arbitrators then
select the third member of the panel.259 This time-tested method of dispute
Resolve;
b. Those areas which the Panel Members Disagree on How to
Resolve; and
3. Panelists Report on Areas of Disagreement Between Panelists;
a. Explanation of Competing Theories in the Area;
b. Scientific Basis of Each Competing Theory
c. Criticism of Each Theory by Adherents to the Opposing
Theories.
f. Costs: all reasonable fees of the members of the Complex Litigation
Science Panel shall be taxed to the parties as costs under FED. R. CIV. P.
54(d).
Commentators evaluating proposals for scientific review beyond a single independent expert under
Federal Rule of Evidence 706 have used varied approaches to the legal basis of the panel. Walker &
Monahan, supra note 252, at 826 (proposing a science panel formed under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 53). Due to the significance of the change from existing rules, this author suggests a new,
separate rule, distinct from the prior existing framework.
257
Proposed FED. R. CIV. P. 74, supra note 256; see also supra Part IV.A. (discussing the idea of
a scientific consultant).
258
See Michael Straubel, Enhancing the Performance of the Doping Court: How the Court of
Arbitration for Sport Can Do Its Job Better, 36 LOY. U. CHI L.J. 1203, 1225 (2005) (citing Int’l
Olympic Comm., Court of Arbitration for Sport, Statutes of the Bodies Working for the Settlement of
Sports-Related Disputes R41.1 (1984), available at http://www.tas-cas.org/d2wfiles/document/281/
5048/0/3.1%20CodeEngnov2004.pdf) (discussing appointment process for arbitrators in disputes
requiring panel of multiple arbitrators). See also North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.Mex., art. 1120, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 605 (providing for submission of claims to arbitration under
NAFTA).
259
North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 1120, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M.
605. In the Breast Implant Multi District Litigation, Judge Pointer used a separate method of selection
involving a committee created to determine whom to choose. Walker & Monahan, supra note 252, at
808 (reviewing order issued by Judge Pointer, from In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab.
Litig., No. CV 92-P-10000-S, 1996 WL 34401813, at *1–2 (N.D. Ala. May 31, 1996)).
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resolution would work well for selection of the CLSP as well.
Finally, any CLSP must issue a “Scientific Panel Advisory Report”
(“SPAR”) regarding the issue in dispute before the court.260 In reviewing
the reports of the litigants’ experts, the SPAR should detail the areas of
consensus between the litigants’ experts, and areas of disagreement
between those experts. For the areas of disagreement, the panel should
report on which disagreements between the litigants’ experts the panelists
are uniform in opinion, and on which the panelists disagree and why. As
for areas of disagreement among panelists, the panel should report the two
or more major bodies of theory in the area, the scientific basis, and the
criticism of each. Finally, the report should provide recommendations to
the judge for future analysis of similar areas or potential developments in
the field.261 With each of these components, the SPAR informs the judge
of areas that are not subject to disagreement, those that are, and why, so
that the judge can use that information in his final application of the
Daubert rules.
The CLSP approach provides a series of benefits in complex litigation:
the review of the parties’ expert reports by experts knowledgeable in the
field, the fair selection process through an arbitration model, and the
potential for a complex, detailed, and complete report (including minority
views) on the issues in dispute. Scientists would select the third panel
member, so they would presumably be able to select someone whose
scientific credentials and methodology are respected in the field.262 In
addition, a tripartite panel overcomes the potential bias claims against an
individually appointed scientific consultant, assuming that three scientists
might have more diverse opinions than one lone expert.263 Finally, the
SPAR report would provide enough detail for the judge to make a final and
informed Daubert decision, and provide guidelines for other judges to
review when faced with similar admissibility decisions. Each of these
considerations overcomes potential weaknesses in the Daubert system seen
in the epidemiologic risk controversy.264
As with the issue of individual science consultants under Rule 706,
critics may attack the science panel approach by charging it is too costly or
260
The procedure described in this paragraph comes from Proposed FED. R. CIV. P. 74(e), supra
note 256.
261
The recommendations for judicial review assist the judge in the initial case with the Daubert
findings, but are extremely helpful to future judges in analyzing similar but not identical scientific
information.
262
This overcomes a concern of judges that they are unable to find a suitable expert. Cecil &
Willging, supra note 239, at 1022.
263
See discussion supra Part IV.A. (addressing criticism that a singular court appointed expert
might taint the process with his own individual bias).
264
See discussion supra Part III (discussing flaws in the Daubert regime when applied to
epidemiologic risk cases).
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inefficient. On the issue of cost, a three-expert panel will certainly entail
significant expenditure. However, this expense can be mitigated to some
degree by the expertise and experience of the selected scientists. With
their collective knowledge base, they should be able to easily and
efficiently identify and address pertinent issues. Cost may also be
mitigated by the involvement of appropriate professional societies to
provide services within this panel system.265 Another consideration is that
the cost, while initially high, should be measured against the value of
keeping the courthouse door open to valid claims which otherwise might
be shut out, and the cost of “getting it right” the first time in the report
issued by the panel. Had the Daubert II court been more discerning in its
review of the epidemiology in that case, by either using a more detailed
scientific basis for the opinion, or by reconsidering the scientists portrayal
of the doubling of the risk standard as poor science, many other errors in
similar cases relying on Daubert II might have been avoided.266
For the most complex and detailed cases, and for cases of first
impression in scientific fields, a science panel approach based on
arbitration principles would overcome some of the weaknesses of the
current Daubert regime. It would allow for the wise exercise of Rule 702
judicial discretion, provide detailed insight for further court opinions, and
use the knowledge of specialists in the field for the benefit of the judicial
process.
2. Court of Scientific Jurisdiction
A specialized Court of Scientific Jurisdiction (“CSJ”) provides an
alternative to the science panel approach. The idea of a science court
handling specialized cases dates to the 1960s, and was largely debated in
the 1970s and 1980s.267 Proposals from this era varied from scientific
265
Some scientists champion the need for greater interaction among professional societies and
lawyers within complex science. Rodricks & Rieth, supra note 50, at 31. On the issue of the National
Academy of Sciences weighing in on a controversy before courts, see Walker & Monahan, supra note
252, at 812–13.
266
See supra Parts II.B.–D. (reviewing the caselaw in the wake of Daubert II). Walker &
Monahan, evaluating their proposal of using a Rule 53 independent panel, have noted that “the greatest
benefits in terms of efficiency and justice would occur in collateral or other cases involving the same
question of general causation. In this situation, the scientific authority model permits the use of
doctrines of precedence to reduce redundancy and encourage courts to decide similar cases similarly.”
Walker & Monahan, supra note 252, at 830.
267
See David L. Bazelon, Coping with Technology Through the Legal Process, 62 CORNELL L.
REV. 817, 817–18 (1977) (discussing the role of courts in evaluating and deciding complex issues of
science and technology); Troyen A. Brennan, Causal Chains and Statistical Links: The Role of
Scientific Uncertainty in Hazardous-Substance Litigation, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 469, 470–71 (1988)
(considering a “regulatory apparatus” to resolve “hazardous-substance-induced injury claims” as an
alternative to tort actions); Arthur Kantrowitz, The Science Court Experiment, 17 JURIMETRICS J. 332,
332 (1977) (reporting on the “feasibility of a series of experiments to help define the promise and
problems of the Science Court approach for providing factual basis for policy-making”); Arthur
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advisory panels to appellate panel structures, subject-specific to general in
scope.268 While the subject generated much commentary many years ago,
science court proposals and analysis lessened during the shift from the
Frye to the Daubert regime of evidentiary review. However, now with
over fifteen years of Daubert review to analyze, and with the Daubert
system revealing weaknesses in complex scientific review,269 the idea of a
science court should be reconsidered.
A centralized CSJ could manage a science docket consisting of an
enumerated class of certified complex science cases delegated to it from
the general federal courts.270 Congress would have to pass enabling
legislation to create the CSJ as an Article III court, and when doing so
Congress should authorize permanent placement of the CSJ in the national
capital.271 Two questions regarding the CSJ then immediately arise: what
cases will qualify to be heard within the CSJ, and what will be the structure
of the court. By answering these, the benefits of a CSJ become apparent.
For a federal court to have jurisdiction at all, Congress must maintain
minimal diversity requirements.272 With minimal diversity jurisdiction
satisfied, the substantive jurisdiction of the court would then include the
same class of complex, cutting-edge, and likely-to-be-addressed-again set
of cases that the CLSP would have under Proposed Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 74.273 Under that rule, and for the CSJ, the science docket
includes three separate considerations: a determination of essential need by
the initial generalist judge, high potential for re-evaluation in the future, or
the determination that a single scientific consultant under Rule 706 would
Kantrowitz, Proposal for an Institution for Scientific Judgment, 156 SCI. 763, 763 (1967) (concerning
the “institutionaliz[ation] [of] the scientific advisory function” of the science community and
recommendations to increase the “presumptive validity of the scientific input”); William V. Luneburg
& Mark A. Nordenberg, Specially Qualified Juries and Expert Nonjury Tribunals: Alternatives for
Coping with the Complexities of Modern Civil Litigation, 67 VA. L. REV. 887, 888 (1981) (discussing
use of “‘special’ juries and expert nonjury tribunals” for “complex federal civil cases”); James A.
Martin, The Proposed ‘Science Court,’ 75 MICH. L. REV. 1058, 1058 (1977) (evaluating “the
desirability of establishing some kind of science court”); Confronting the New Challenges of Scientific
Evidence, supra note 247, at 1603–05 (proposing the “establishment of a special court presided over by
expert judges” to hear “complex and scientific cases”).
268
Compare, e.g., Brennan, supra note 267, at 523 (discussing hazardous substance panel
proposal), with Luneburg & Nordenberg, supra note 267, at 995–99 (proposing generalized structure
for all complex disputes).
269
See discussion supra Part III.
270
The class of cases qualifying for adjudication by the Court of Scientific Jurisdiction would be
the same class of certified complex cases listed in Proposed FED. R. CIV. P. 74(b), supra note 256.
271
Confronting the New Challenges of Scientific Evidence, supra note 247, at 1604 (recognizing
that any science court proposal requires Congressional authorization under Article III of the
Constitution).
272
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2009) (setting minimal diversity jurisdiction limit for class action
suits, created by the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005)). The
CSJ would require a similar minimal diversity for jurisdictional purposes.
273
See supra note 256.
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not be appropriate. Under the enabling act, the CSJ would have original
jurisdiction over cases meeting the substantive standard for the CSJ, and
also could accept cases re-assigned to it by general federal courts when the
judge makes a finding of need for reassignment.
Second, the structure of the CSJ would be fundamentally different than
a typical, generalist district courthouse. Judges assigned to the CSJ would
be Article III judges, but since their docket would contain mainly complex
science, they must be selected for judicial worthiness with some
consideration of scientific background or skill. The enabling act need not
explicitly mandate a certain level of scientific or mathematical training, but
as a practical matter an advanced degree should be a prerequisite. Judges
could also come from a variety of disciplines, so that overall a wide variety
of skills come together under the one roof of the CSJ.
In addition to scientifically skilled judges, the CSJ could, as the
centralized court in the field, regularly appoint “science clerks” in addition
to the legal clerks a federal court normally appoints. Science clerks would
permit the judges to further evaluate and refine science testimony and
issues, particularly if outside the particular discipline of the judge.275 If
judges can appoint clerks to assist them in making legal findings, a science
clerk to assist in making science findings under Daubert seems appropriate
as well.
Besides the staffing on the bench and in chambers, the CSJ would
operate under the identical Rules of Civil Procedure and Rules of Evidence
as a standard federal court. As a result, the CSJ judges would continue to
make Daubert rulings on litigants’ expert testimony, hold trials, and draft
written rulings. In these rulings, the CSJ judges could offer an advanced
level of detail in scientific areas, separating the legal and scientific bases of
the opinions, to provide other judges with non-CSJ cases more guidelines
to use in their work. On appeal, the CSJ cases should be appealable to the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.276 Not unlike patent
litigation, the Federal Circuit could become an appellate court familiar
with the special intricacies of the CSJ, and it would become better able to
274
Id. See also supra Part IV.A. (recommending use of scientific consultant). The Independent
Expert from Rule 706 would therefore remain the default method to deal with complex cases, and
solely those cases meeting these advanced criteria merit the use of the science panel/science court
approach. See supra note 231; see also supra text accompanying note 252; Sanders, supra note 185, at
81.
275
The “clerk as advisor” approach has been tried famously in a notable case, when Judge
Wyzanski appointed an economist, Carl Kaysen, to serve as his clerk during the time of a major
antitrust case. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953). For
analysis of United Shoe and the law clerk analogy, see Deason, supra note 251, at 138–40.
276
See LeRoy L. Kondo, Untangling the Tangled Web: Federal Court Reform Through
Specialization for Internet Law and Other High Technology Cases, 2002 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1, 92
(2002); see also Hess, supra note 244, at 554; Luneberg & Nordenberg, supra note 267, at 930–31.
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handle CSJ appeals over time.
The CSJ proposal offers significant benefits over the current structure
of generalist judges handling science cases. The consideration of scientific
literacy in the appointment of Article III judges for the CSJ would
overcome the empirical research finding of generalist judges’ significant
weaknesses in handling complex science and statistics.278 Judges with
scientific training would not have this Achilles’ heel.
Second, the CSJ proposal brings science back into the judicial process
again, in a way not seen since the abrogation of Frye.279 With judges who
have been trained in scientific fields, science knowledge and the “general
state of scientific knowledge” re-enters the courtroom, not through the
litigants’ experts, but through the judge.280
An additional benefit comes from the location of the CSJ in the
national capital. Since the court would be in Washington, D.C., the CSJ
could call upon national bodies of scientific research, such as the National
Academies of Sciences, National Science Foundation, or the American
Association for the Advancement of Science, should the need for courtappointed experts arise.281 This offers the benefit of a large number of
well-trained technicians, unmatched in diversity of fields, within the same
city as the CSJ, and is a benefit unique to this location in the United States.
Finally, the CSJ proposal, as a court of special jurisdiction, is a
specialized structure that has proven to be valuable in other areas of
complex litigation such as business disputes. In the most well-known
example, the Delaware Court of Chancery has been adjudicating complex
business disputes since 1792.282 In handling complex business litigation,
277
See Kondo, supra note 276, at 92 (discussing the use of specialized judges at the Federal
Circuit level); Hess, supra note 244, at 554 (analogizing specialist judges of a science court with
Federal Circuit judges). On the general question of familiarity resulting in judicial accuracy, see
Sanders, supra note 185, at 82.
278
See supra Parts III.A.–B.
279
See supra note 249 (discussing how the general acceptance test of Frye was relegated to only
one consideration in the Daubert system).
280
Id. This also occurs, to a lesser extent, with the science clerks.
281
The National Academies of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, the National
Research Council, and the Institute of Medicine are headquartered in Washington, D.C., as is the
American Association for the Advancement of Science. The National Science Foundation is across the
Potomac in Arlington, VA. See The National Academies: Advisors to the Nation on Science,
Engineering, and Medicine, http://www.nationalacademies.org/ (last visited July 17, 2009); The
American Association for the Advancement of Science, http://www.aaas.org/ (last visited July 17,
2009); The National Science Foundation, http://www.nsf.gov/ (last visited Aug. 4, 2009). See supra
Part IV.A. (suggesting court-appointed experts). For a discussion of the benefit of the scholarly
societies in the Washington area, see Beyea & Berger, supra note 1, at 364; Greenland, Critical
Appraisal, supra note 2, at 308; Rodricks & Rieth, supra note 50, at 31.
282
See William T. Quillen & Michael Hanrahan, A Short History of the Delaware Court of
Chancery—1792–1992, in BICENTENNIAL COMMEMORATION COMMITTEE, COURT OF CHANCERY OF
THE STATE OF DELAWARE 1792–1992 (1992), reprinted in 18 DEL. J. CORP. L. 819, 822 (1993).
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the court has “earned a worldwide reputation for fairness, experience, and
expertise in presiding over corporate disputes.”283 Based on this
reputation, the court attracts litigants from around the United States
interested in a specialized and fair process of adjudication for their
complex disputes.284 Due to the success of the Delaware model, other
states have authorized business or complex commercial courts with similar
models.285 In the context of complex commercial litigation, litigants see
the benefits of a specialized docket and court with specialized
knowledge.286 The same should be true for complex science.
Critics of the science court of specialized jurisdiction may attack the
CSJ proposal on several grounds. Initially, there is a question whether the
court could proceed with jury trials, since the guarantee of a jury trial often
involves a cross-sectional jury from the location of the court.287 It is first
helpful to note that juries need not be selected from the location of the
dispute, but may constitutionally be selected from a district in which there
could have been jurisdiction, after transfer of venue,288 or from another
unrelated district as in a case of media bias.289 Unless the CSJ used a jury
pool selection procedure that impedes on equal protection rights, jury
fairness would be preserved by the proposed structure.290 As long as the
enabling statute of the science court grants it jurisdiction over any case
meeting the substantive terms of jurisdiction, then the court would be an
appropriate location for any complex dispute.291
A second criticism of the proposal could include the argument that any
proposal with nonrandom assignment of judges is bad policy and subject to
abuse.292 In response, it is important to first examine the sources of a
283
Donald F. Parsons, Jr., & Joseph R. Slights III, The History of Delaware’s Business Courts:
Their Rise to Preeminence, BUS. L. TODAY, Mar./Apr. 2008, at 21.
284
Id. at 25.
285
See Lee Applebaum, The “New” Business Courts: Responding to Modern Business and
Commercial Disputes, BUS. L. TODAY, Mar./Apr. 2008, at 13, 14–17 (discussing establishment of
business courts in Florida, Maine, North Carolina, South Carolina, and others); Mnookin, supra note
185, at 1031 (discussing increased use of business/complex civil litigation court model).
286
Specialized decisionmakers are unquestioned in the context of patent and bankruptcy
litigation. See 35 U.S.C. §101 et seq. (2006) (patent statute); 28 U.S.C. §151 et seq. (2006)
(bankruptcy court designation).
287
28 U.S.C. § 1861 (2006).
288
Id. § 1404(a).
289
Id. § 1404(b).
290
Luneburg & Nordenberg, supra note 267, at 923–25.
291
Jurisdiction for the CSJ would be based on a particular jurisdictional statute, for example, 28
U.S.C. § 1332 (1996), creating jurisdiction to that court for all cases which could be brought in federal
court elsewhere but, due to their subject matter, belong at the CSJ. For another example, see the
bankruptcy jurisdictional statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (1996). See supra text accompanying note 271
(noting Congress would need to create CSJ as an Article III court).
292
See, e.g., David J. Damiani, Comment, Proposals for Reform in the Evaluation of Expert
Testimony in Pharmaceutical Mass Tort Cases, 13 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 517, 542–45 (2003)
(discussing neutrality and undue influence concerns in specialized science courts).
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potential randomness requirement. While Congress has seen bills
requiring random assignment of judges, those proposals have not been
passed into law.293 Under the current United States Code, 28 U.S.C. § 137,
the chief judge of the district court is responsible for the observance of
assignment rules adopted by the district judges.294 This statute does not
mandate random assignment,295 and so far the case law regarding a
constitutional right to random assignment has been “generally hostile to the
approach and undertake[n] little thoughtful analysis.”296 Randomness is
often a result of local rules within the circuit, but often the rules are
deemed “‘housekeeping’ measures” or are not enforced.297 Since there is
no “right” to random assignment, the courts have not enforced random
assignment as an obligation on the judicial selection of cases.298 As a
result, the assignment of a controversy to the CSJ would not infringe upon
a protected right of a litigant.
Even if not a “right,” courts often mention that the selection of the
judge or courtroom should not be arbitrary, based on improper grounds, or
create an appearance of impropriety.299 None of these concerns are raised
by the CSJ. Because the court is created to handle a certain class of cases,
and structured to better handle them, a reassignment is not arbitrary or
without cause. Nor is a reassignment based on improper grounds; rather, it
reflects the judgment of Congress, in enacting the CSJ enabling act, that
well-trained specialists with technical backgrounds can better handle
disputes involving complex or cutting-edge scientific evidence. Finally, as
to the appearance of impropriety, the CSJ enhances rather than diminishes
the fairness to the parties, allowing for fair, impartial adjudication of the
dispute, within the framework of a court better able to handle the
That structure is more appropriate and addresses the
dispute.300
weaknesses exposed within the current system.
For the subset of the most complex, detailed, and first-impression
cases in scientific fields, a court of special jurisdiction for science would
provide an institutionalized alternative to the science panel approach.301
The court would allow dispute resolution in a specialized setting, proven to
293
See Blind Justice Act of 1999, S. 1484, 106th Cong. (1999) (referred to the Committee on the
Judiciary) (proposing random assignment of judges except in related cases and technical cases).
294
28 U.S.C. § 137 (2006).
295
See J. Robert Brown, Jr. & Allison Herren Lee, Neutral Assignment of Judges at the Court of
Appeals, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1037, 1090 (2000) (discussing the absence of statutory authority prescribing
neutral assignment of federal judges).
296
Id. at 1099.
297
Id. at 1096 (citations omitted).
298
Id. at 1096–99 (citing In re Yagman, 796 F.2d 1165 (9th Cir. 1986)).
299
Id. at 1098, 1101–02 (citations omitted).
300
See supra text accompanying notes 282–84 (discussing the Delaware Court of Chancery’s
reputation for fairness in adjudicating complex business disputes).
301
See supra Part IV.B.1. (describing Complex Litigation Science Panels).
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be effective in the complex business litigation context. It also has the
added benefit of proximity to the major organizations of scientific
advancement in the U.S. By sending the most complex science cases to
the CSJ, the court system could overcome weaknesses of the current
Daubert regime, allowing for the wise exercise of Rule 702 discretion
within the Daubert framework.
C. Discrete Points of Modification
Independent of the structural reform for scientific evidence questions,
discussed in Parts IV.A.–B., several smaller modifications could also
enhance the judicial accuracy and efficiency in handling complex or
cutting-edge science.
1. Allow Modifications to Expert Opinion to Account for New Science,
as “Good Cause” Under Rule 16
In Daubert evaluations, the Supreme Court commands that scientists
bring the same rigor of their discipline to the courtroom as from the
laboratory.302 Under the current formulation of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 16, this may not be possible.
The basic scientific method, and epidemiologic science in particular,
mandates the continued evaluation of new data in formulation and testing
of conclusions.303 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16, however, the
case management order mandates a single disclosure of data and opinions
from experts.304 Any new information after that date cannot be used as a
basis for an opinion of an expert, unless the court grants an amendment to
the case management order for “good cause.”305
In order to ensure that scientists may continue to assimilate data, or at
least take into account new data or studies postdating the initial disclosure,
a Rule 16 determination of “good cause” should include language allowing
modifications of experts’ opinions based on the scientific method.
Whether by committee note, or by including a specific caveat within the
language of Rule 16(b)(4), litigants should be granted leave to amend the
scheduling order for good cause to allow for additional scientific opinion
based on new data postdating the initial disclosures.
The proposal to allow modification of a scheduling order for scientific
good cause has several benefits. First, it returns the rigor of the laboratory
to the courtroom, as Daubert commands.306 In addition, it allows for the
court to correct, before it is enshrined in precedent, a scientific
302

Kuhmo Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999).
See supra Part III.E.2. (noting how the discovery process may impede this goal).
304
See supra text accompanying notes 221–23.
305
FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(4); see supra text accompanying note 223.
306
See supra notes 229, 302, and accompanying text.
303
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misconception that has already been shown to be without scientific basis.
In doing so, it prevents what has been deemed “judicial junk” by
prominent commentators in the field of epidemiology.307 “Judicial junk”
has a tendency to mislead future courts,308 so correcting known errors early
in the process is worth the time and expense necessary to modify the
disclosed expert opinions. Otherwise, the ability to re-examine the
scientific content will be lost as appellate decisions focus on the legal rules
under the appropriate standard of review.309
Critics of this proposal may state that it is impractical in application,
allowing late endorsement of experts by lazy litigants who erroneously
endorsed the expert at the first disclosure. Some litigants may see this as
an opportunity to try to “game” the system, play hide the ball, or whatever
metaphor applies to disingenuous litigation tactics. Judges should be
aware of this as a possibility, using the “good cause” rule on science only
for those cases when the new data or studies truly postdate the initial
disclosures. We trust judges to make these determinations in normal Rule
16(b)(4) motions to modify a scheduling order, and we should trust that
judges will be able to make determinations on the issue of scientific
changes as well.
2. Focus of Judicial Training
Another method to increase the judicial accuracy, efficiency, and
consistency of scientific evidence under Daubert is to increase the
opportunity for judicial training in the general theories, methodologies, and
practice of scientific research.
Empirical research demonstrates that judges lack fundamental
knowledge in basic science concepts and statistics.310 In addition, when
asked about the number of classes in science or math in their educational
background, judges scored below a subset of the jury pool consisting of
college graduates.311 As a result, judges as a class of professionals lack
some of the essential skills needed to handle the Daubert analysis. One
approach to dealing with this issue is to bring science into chambers, by
either appointment of independent experts or use of science panels or a
science court.312
However, for some scientific principles the reform need not advance
that far. Judges can be, and are, trained at conferences, workshops, or
307

Beyea & Berger, supra note 1, at 348–49.
Id. at 348, 353.
309
Daubert decisions are subject to an abuse of discretion standard. G.E. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136,
141 (1997).
310
See discussion supra Parts III.A.–B. (discussing judicial weakness in these areas).
311
See supra text accompanying note 132.
312
See discussion supra Parts IV.A.–B. (detailing proposed science panel or science court).
308
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other events held by scientists.
While there may be a potential for
conflicts of interest in the sponsorship of these training sessions,314
workshops and conferences appear to be utilized by judges in their training
in science or statistics.315
An important consideration, even in light of this use of CLE and
workshops in specific areas of science, is that empirical evidence shows
judges overwhelmingly (ninety-six percent) have not received training in
general scientific principles.316 As a result, the training in the specific
areas may well be too complex, or too subject specific, to be of use in the
wide variety of cases before a court of general jurisdiction.
In response, the respected bodies of scientists should tailor some of
their continuing education goals to filling the unmet need in general
methodologies and procedures of scientific research. As a result, judges
can be trained to be critical of proposed expert testimony, better able to
know the assumptions contained within research, and less dependent on the
opposing expert to point out weaknesses in an opinion by a litigant’s
expert.317
V. CONCLUSION
The Daubert system for judicial screening of expert evidence for
relevance and reliability assumed judges would be able to analyze,
critically evaluate, and make value judgments about the relative worth of
highly complex, cutting-edge science.
Following Daubert, courts faced difficulty with these determinations
under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. In a series of cases following
Daubert, courts faced the challenge of complex epidemiologic risk
evidence. While inconsistently handling the epidemiologic risk evidence
under Daubert, the judicial handling of this complex field of science
exposed other weaknesses of the Daubert system.
Weaknesses of the Daubert regime include judicial knowledge and
background with fundamental scientific principles, judicial ability to
handle complex statistical information, overuse of bright-line tests that
313
Beyea & Berger, supra note 1, at 370; see DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LEGAL ALCHEMY 200 (1999)
(explaining the training programs of the Federal Judicial Center, National Judicial College, and Private
Adjudication Center, to teach judges science and statistics).
314
Greenland, Critical Appraisal, supra note 2, at 309. This is not a reason to fail to have training
sessions, but rather emphasizes the need for content-neutral, non-conflicted sponsorship by
organizations such as the Federal Judicial Center or National Judicial College. See FAIGMAN, supra
note 313, at 200.
315
See Gatowski et al., supra note 123, at 442 (finding that sixty-three percent of judges surveyed
reported having attended a CLE class about specific scientific evidence).
316
Id.
317
Id. at 455; Greenland, Critical Appraisal, supra note 2, at 309; Beyea & Berger, supra note 1,
at 370.
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may lack scientific validity, the use of litigation experts who may not
represent the general state of knowledge in the field, and the
incompatibility of the judicial procedure with measured evaluation of
complex scientific principles. Each identified issue presents a reason why
a judge may inconsistently or inaccurately evaluate the most difficult
scientific principles.
Identifying weaknesses with the Daubert review, however, allows us
to work to fix the problems by modifying the current system. One way to
bring more science back into the courthouse, or to judges’ chambers, is to
permit the appointment of a science consultant under a modified Federal
Rule of Evidence 706. For an even smaller subset of cases, more radical
reform is appropriate. In those cases, use of a science panel constituted
under a modified arbitration panel format would create a formalized
process for review. In the alternative, a Court of Scientific Jurisdiction
offers significant advantages to the process, and has met with great success
in the complex business litigation context. Finally, other smaller reforms,
such as refocusing continuing education efforts and the expansion of “good
cause” to include the development of knowledge in the field, plug holes in
the Daubert system exposed by the epidemiologic risk controversy.
By critically examining the breakdown of Daubert in the face of
epidemiologic risk evidence, evaluating the nature of the weaknesses in the
system, and initiating changes structured to respond to those reforms, we
can modify the current Daubert system to allow judges to more
consistently, accurately, and efficiently handle the most complex cuttingedge science presented in the courtroom.

